Showing posts with label Carrier. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Carrier. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Russia May Fly Military Cargo to Syria: Report------------Defense News


MOSCOW — Russia may decide to fly a controversial military cargo of helicopters and air defense systems to Syria after it abandoned an attempt to ship the material by sea, according to a June 27 report.
The West wants Russia to halt military cooperation with Syria because of the escalating conflict between the Damascus regime and rebels, but Moscow has insisted it cannot break contracts.
A freighter, the Alaed, docked in the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk over the weekend after turning back off the British coast. The ship halted its voyage to Syria to deliver the military cargo when its British insurer dropped coverage.
“The three Mi-25 helicopters and air defense systems could easily be delivered to Syria by air,” a military source, who was not identified, told the Interfax news agency.
“Russia has to fulfill its obligations. But everything will depend on if we can resist pressure from the West, who want us to break military cooperation with Syria,” the source said, adding a decision would be made soon.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has confirmed the Alaed was carrying three attack helicopters Moscow had repaired for Damascus under a previous agreement.
He said last week the cargo also included air defense systems but gave no further details on the type or quantity on board.
Russia delivers a range of limited air defense systems to Syria but reportedly has refused to provide the more advanced S-300 technology that it had previously also failed to give to Iran under Western pressure.
The Vedomosti business daily reported June 26 that Russia this year chose to withhold the S-300 from Syria, despite a $105 million delivery contract being signed by the system’s producer and Damascus in 2011.
Military experts have speculated that the Alaed was carrying the more basic Russian Buk-M2e air defense systems for Syria, whose forces last week shot down a Turkish warplane off the Syrian coast.
In Murmansk, the Alaed’s flag has been changed to a Russian flag from that of the Caribbean island of Curacao.
But Russia has yet to confirm if the ship will now make a repeat attempt to reach the Syrian port of Tartus or travel on to Russia’s Far East port city of Vladivostok as originally planned.

Sunday, January 29, 2012

New Floating Bases For U.S. Navy------Defense News

The U.S. amphibious ship USS Ponce is to be converted as a base for minesweeping helicopters, patrol boats and special forces based in the Persian Gulf.

Decades after the idea was broached for a floating, mobile base to support operating forces in the Persian Gulf, the concept has suddenly shifted into high gear, and a sense of urgency is driving both new U.S. ship construction and conversion of an existing vessel.
A new Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) is mentioned almost in passing within the Pentagon budget briefing document made public Jan. 26. Development funding will be provided, the document said, for a new AFSB “that can be dedicated to support missions in areas where ground-based access is not available, such as countermine operations.”
Elsewhere, under “industrial base skills,” the documents noted that, “for example, adding the afloat forward staging base addresses urgent operational shortfalls and will help sustain the shipbuilding industry in the near-term and mitigate the impact of reducing ship procurement in the” budget.
What is all this verbiage code for?
“This fulfills a long-standing requirement from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), going back to the Tanker Wars of the late 1980s,” said Capt. Chris Sims, a spokesman for U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Va.
Sims was referring specifically to a recent decision to modify the amphibious transport dock ship Ponce — which had been scheduled to be decommissioned March 30 — into an interim AFSB able to support minesweeping MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters.
The ship will be operated jointly by active-duty Navy officers and sailors, and by government civilian mariners employed by Military Sealift Command (MSC) — a hybrid crew similar to those used on the Navy’s two submarine tenders and the command ship Mount Whitney.
Beyond the conversion, though, the Navy now plans to build at least one, and possibly two, AFSBs.
U.S. Navy officials would not publicly confirm the new construction, but sources confirmed the service plans to modify the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) design to take on the AFSB role.
Three MLPs have been funded for construction at the General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding (NASSCO) shipyard in San Diego. The ships are large, 765-foot-long vessels able to float off small landing craft, tugs or barges.
For the AFSB role, a fourth MLP hull would be modified with several decks, including a hangar, topped by a large flight deck able to operate the heavy H-53s in the airborne mine countermeasures role.
But the AFSB will also be able to carry Marines, support patrol and special operations craft, and fuel and arm other helicopters.
The ship is expected to be requested in 2014.
Sources also said the Navy might be considering modifying the third MLP to the AFSB mission. Construction of that ship, funded in the 2012 defense bill, is being negotiated between NASSCO and the Navy.
Conversion of the Ponce, meanwhile, is proceeding with alacrity. MSC issued requests for proposal (RFPs) on Jan. 24 to upgrade and refit the ship. Bids are to be submitted by Feb. 3, with work to begin in mid-month. The RFPs state that sea trials are to be carried out in mid-April.
The work includes upgrading the ship’s navigation systems, bringing habitability up to MSC standards and general refurbishment. No flight modifications are planned at this time, said MSC spokesman Tim Boulay.
Fleet Forces Command also has begun solicitations for 50 Navy personnel to help man the ship in its special mission role.
The Ponce had returned to Norfolk from its final cruise Dec. 2, and crewmembers had already begun the inactivation process when the order came down to keep the ship running.
Use of the ship, Sims said, was “seen as an opportunity to fulfill that longstanding CENTCOM request.”



Tuesday, January 24, 2012

Gortney named Head of U.S. Fleet Forces


. President Obama has nominated Vice Adm. Bill Gortney as the next commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, a move that if approved by the Senate would likely occur this summer.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made the announcement Monday.
Gortney, director of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, would be promoted to admiral and replace Adm. John Harvey, who has commanded what was once known as U.S. Atlantic Fleet since July 2009. Gortney reported to the Pentagon in July 2010.
Harvey, with three years on the job come summer, is expected to retire.
Naval observers and industry insiders told Navy Times in late December that Gortney appeared to have the inside track on the job, saying he possesses the right combination of experience in preparing ships and aircraft to deploy, knowledge of overseas combatant commander requirements and understanding of wartime fleet operations.
Gortney will bring extensive experience in the war theater of operations to the job; since 2002, he’s commanded Carrier Air Wing 7 and Carrier Strike Group 10, both of which operated in the Central Command area of operations, and U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain. He also has a previous hitch at Fleet Forces Command under his belt, having served as deputy chief of staff for global force management and joint operations from 2004-2006.
Gortney’s current job is his second go-round on the Joint Staff; he worked at the J-33 Joint Operations Department, Central Command Division, from 1998-1999.
That pallet of experience, particularly in the war zones, will serve him well at the helm of Fleet Forces, says retired Vice Adm. Peter Daly, chief executive officer of the U.S. Naval Institute and a former Fleet Forces deputy commander under Harvey.
“It’s very important because Fleet Forces … generates all the forces coming off the East Coast, and also has a special responsibility for standards for training all strike groups, East and West Coast,” said Daly, reached in San Diego, where USNI is holding its annual West Coast Conference and Symposium. The commander of Fleet Forces Command, Daly said, has to be someone “who understands what it takes to get there, what’s needed and what’s required when they’re at the tip of the spear. And Bill Gortney represents that.
“He’s an affable guy, but he’s no-nonsense when it comes to the warfighting piece,” Daly said. “I think he’s an excellent choice.”
In addition to its responsibilities for manning, training and equipping all Navy forces east of the Mississippi and providing same to overseas combatant commanders, Fleet Forces Command advises the chief of naval operations on all integrated warfighter capability requirements. It also handles the Navy’s anti-terrorism/force protection, individual augmentee and sea basing programs for the CNO.
Gortney is a 1977 graduate of Elon College in North Carolina. He earned a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve in September 1977 and, in December 1978, was designated as a naval aviator. He has flown more than 5,360 “mishap-free hours,” according to his official biography, and made 1,265 carrier-arrested landings, primarily in the A-7E Corsair II and the F/A-18 Hornet.

Monday, January 23, 2012

American Carrier crosses Strait Of Hormuz Unharmed


The USS Abraham Lincoln  aircraft  carrier passed  through  Strait of Hormuz on Jan. 22 and is now in the Persian Gulf, the Pentagon said, after Tehran threatened to close the strategic shipping route.
"USS Abraham Lincoln ... completed a regular and routine transit of the Strait of Hormuz ... to conduct maritime security operations as scheduled," Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. John Kirby said in an email to AFP. "The transit was completed as previously scheduled and without incident." 
The carrier, which can have up to 80 planes and helicopters onboard, was escorted by the guided-missile cruiser Cape St. George and two destroyers.
Earlier, Britain's Ministry of Defence said a British Royal Navy frigate and a French vessel had joined the carrier group to sail through the waterway.
While allied ships often participate in U.S. naval exercises and sometimes are part of joint naval flotillas, the presence of British and French ships seemed to be a message to Tehran about the West's resolve to keep the route open.
"HMS Argyll and a French vessel joined a U.S. carrier group transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, to underline the unwavering international commitment to maintaining rights of passage under international law," said a spokesman from Britain's MoD.
He said Britain maintained "a constant presence in the region as part of our enduring contribution to Gulf security."
Iran's military and political leaders had warned they could close the strait — a key transit route for global oil supplies — if increased Western sanctions over Tehran's suspect nuclear program halt Iranian oil exports.
The Islamic republic's navy had also warned it would react if the U.S. tried to redeploy one of its aircraft carriers to the waterway.
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has repeatedly said closing the strait would cross a "red line." Two of the 11 U.S. aircraft carriers are in the region.
Since then, Iran has tried to ease tensions, with Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi saying last week that Tehran had never tried to close the strait.
“We want peace and stability in the region," Salehi said.
European Union foreign ministers meeting Jan. 23 in Brussels are expected to agree to sanction Iran's central bank and announce an embargo on buying Iranian oil.
The U.S., France, Britain and Germany accuse Iran of seeking to build a nuclear bomb, but Tehran says its nuclear drive is peaceful.

U.S. won't cut Carriers below 11

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, left, arrives aboard the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise on Jan. 21.

ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER USS ENTERPRISE — Pentagon budget cuts will not threaten the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet and the U.S. Navy plans to keep 11 afloat, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Jan. 21.
“The carriers play a major role in our force, not only today but they will play an important role in the future. You’re part of what keeps our force agile and flexible and quickly deployable and capable on taking on any enemy anywhere in the world,” Panetta told about 1,700 sailors.
“It’s for that reason that the president of the U.S. and all of us working at the Department of Defense, have decided that it is important to maintain our carrier force at full strength and that means we’ll be keeping our 11 carriers in our force,” Panetta said to a swell of cheers in one of the ship’s hangars.
The Pentagon has to find $487 billion in spending cuts in the next decade.
Experts and analysts speculated in recent weeks over the upkeep costs for aircraft carriers as Panetta will have to deliver a belt-tightening budget in the near future.
He said maintaining the carriers, each of which carry near 80 aircraft and helicopters, was key to U.S. military projection in the Pacific and Mideast, but indicated that the Navy would face some cost-cutting.
“We have to look at every area,” Panetta said.
USS Enterprise, cruising off Georgia, is supposed to be taken out of service at year end, after 51 years at sea. The Navy will have 10 carriers for three years — the time it will take to finish building USS Gerald Ford.
Panetta said that USS Enterprise, which is headed to the Middle East in March, would pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic shipping lane that Iran is threatening to close.
“It will be going through the Strait of Hormuz,” Panetta said, noting that two U.S. carriers — the USS Carl Vinson and the USS Abraham Lincoln — were already in the Gulf region.
“Obviously we are fully prepared to deal with any contingency in that part of the world,” Panetta said.
“We’ll continue to work with the international community, we’ll continue to put sanctions on them,” he said, referring to Iran. “We’ll continue to make those messages clear. The most important way to make those messages clear is to show that we are prepared, that we are strong, that we’ll have a presence in that part of the world.”

Thursday, January 19, 2012

U.S. Navy Document Plans Carrier Air Wings’ Future


The U.S. Navy’s carrier air wings of tomorrow will look very different from today’s, according to a new document produced by the sea services.
By 2032, the Navy’s fleet of F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and new EA-18G Growler electronic attack jets will have begun to be replaced by new types, a new document called Naval Aviation Vision 2012 says.
The Navy will consider manned, unmanned and optionally manned aircraft to replace the long serving Rhino, as the F/A-18E/F is known to carrier deck crews. The Super Hornet will begin to reach the end of its service life around 2025 and must be replaced. The document says a competitive fly-off will be held at some point in the future.
The Super Hornet-derived EA-18G will also start being replaced by a new aircraft, but the document offers no further details.
Additionally, a new Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) is to be integrated onto the carrier deck around 2018 — possibly with four to six planes embarked. The aircraft could make use of technologies developed by the X-47B program. The Navy document calls for “balanced survivability” so that the unmanned strike plane will be effective in “specified tactical situations.”
The F-35C will serve alongside these prospective aircraft.
But the Navy isn’t going to stop with replacing just its fixed-wing assets, as the document calls for the wholesale replacement of its helicopter fleet.
The MH-60 helicopter fleet will be supplanted by a new rotary-wing aircraft. The Fire Scout unmanned helicopter will also be replaced as will the MH-53E Sea Dragon counter-mine and heavy lift helicopter. In the case of the MH-53E, a replacement aircraft needs to be operational by 2026, the document says.
The Marines will get a Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System (CRUAS) by 2032, and the service’s entire fleet of tactical remotely operated drones will be replaced. The Navy will continue to fly the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance version of the Global Hawk unmanned plane in 2032.
The training aircraft fleet will look similar to today’s, the document says. The T-6 and T-45C will soldier on, as will the TH-57 training helicopter. But the T-44 and TC-12B multi-engine turboprop trainers will be replaced with a new aircraft. The Marines’ C-20 and Navy’s C-26D and UC-12 fleets will also be replaced. As well, a new plane will take the place of the C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery plane starting in 2026.
Nor has the Navy forgotten about its fleet of F-5 and F-16 aggressor aircraft. A replacement aggressor aircraft is envisioned for 2025, according to the document.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

U.S. prepared for Hormuz Action


WASHINGTON — The United States is “fully prepared” for any confrontation with Iran over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, but hopes a dispute would be resolved peacefully, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Jan. 18.
“We obviously always continue to make preparations to be prepared for any contingency, but we are not making any special steps ... because we’re fully prepared to deal with that situation now,” Panetta told reporters.
Tehran threatened to close the strait — a chokepoint for one-fifth of the world’s traded oil — late last month, in the event of a military strike or severe tightening of international sanctions over its disputed nuclear program.
Washington is beefing up its naval presence in waters just outside the Gulf in response to the threats.
“We have always maintained a very strong presence in that region. We have a Navy fleet located there,” Panetta said.
“We have a military presence in that region ... to make very clear that we were going to do everything possible to help secure the peace in that part of the world.”
The defense chief said Washington has been clear on its effort to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and from closing the Strait of Hormuz.
“Our goal has always been to make very clear that we would hope that any differences that we have, any concerns we have can be peacefully resolved and done through international laws and international rules,” he said.
“We abide by those international laws and international rules. We would hope that Iran would do the same.”
He declined to comment on a report which said Washington had sent a letter to Iran regarding its threatened closure of the waterway, but said “we have channels in which we deal with the Iranians, and we continue to use those channels.”
On Jan. 13, the New York Times, citing unnamed U.S. officials, reported that Washington had used a secret channel to warn Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that closing the narrow strategic waterway would cross a “red line” and provoke a response.
Panetta said the postponement of joint military exercises with Israel came at the request of his Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak.
“Minister Barak approached me and indicated that they were interested in postponing the exercise,” he said.
“We looked at it and determined that in order to be able to plan better and to do this so that we would be able to conduct that exercise that it would be better to postpone.”
Israeli officials said on Jan. 16 that the postponement was because of regional tensions and instability, and that the drill will probably take place in the second half of 2012.
The joint maneuver was to have been the biggest yet between the two allies and was seen as an opportunity to display their joint military strength at a time of growing concern about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
But it was to come at a time of rising tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, which Israel, Washington and much of the international community believe masks a weapons drive.

"Attack on Iran would be catastrophe " says Russia


MOSCOW — Russia on Jan. 18 said a military strike on Iran would be a “catastrophe” with the severest consequences that risked inflaming existing tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also accused the West of trying to suffocate the Iranian economy and incite popular discontent with new sanctions such as a proposed oil embargo.
“As for the chances of this catastrophe happening, you would have to ask those constantly mentioning it as an option that remains on the table,” Lavrov said when asked about the chances of military action.
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak had earlier said his country was not even close to deciding to attack Iran over its nuclear weapons program and still believed that a military option remained “very far away.”
Lavrov told an annual foreign policy briefing that the chances of war were too dire too contemplate because they would incite intercommunal tensions in the region and flood neighboring countries with Iranian refugees.
“I have no doubt in the fact that it will only add fuel to the fire of the still-simmering Sunni-Shiite conflict. And I do not know where the subsequent chain reaction will end, Lavrov said.
“There will be large flows of refugees from Iran, including to Azerbaijan, and from Azerbaijan to Russia. ... This will not be a walk in the park,” he said of possible military involvement.
Lavrov added that punitive sanctions aimed at winning more transparency from Iran had “exhausted” themselves and only hurt the chances of peace.
“Additional unilateral sanctions against Iran have nothing to do with a desire to ensure the regime’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation,” Lavrov said. “It is seriously aimed at suffocating the Iranian economy and the well being of its people, probably in the hope of inciting discontent.”
His comments came as European Union diplomats closed in on a July date for a full oil embargo that would suit nations such as Italy with a strong reliance on Iranian supplies.
Lavrov said Russia had evidence that Iran was ready to cooperate closely with inspectors from the United Nations IAEA nuclear watchdog and was preparing for “serious talks” with the West.
He also hinted that Europe and the United States were imposing the measures with the specific purpose of torpedoing new rounds of talks.
Russia has been one of the few world powers to enjoy open access to senior Iranian leaders and on Jan. 18 hosted its Supreme National Security Council deputy chief Ali Bagheri.
The Iranian embassy said Bagheri would hold talks with Lavrov and discuss the option of resuming nuclear negotiations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany.
Moscow was also due to receive Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar on Jan. 22 for talks focusing on domestic security issues and drug trafficking.
Tehran’s ambassador to Moscow for his part said he expected Russia’s support to continue because it too was being threatened by the West.
“We expect Russia not to agree to a deal with the West,” Iranian Ambassador Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi told the Interfax news agency.
“If there are (non-Western) countries that want to see Iran become a victim of the West, they must understand that the West will get to them too,” said Sajjadi. “We hope that the Russian government and the Russian people will take note of this.”







F-35C Tailhook Design Blamed for Landing Issues

Lockheed Martin has traced issues with the F-35C's tailhook problem to design and is correcting it, the company said.Lockheed Martin has traced the U.S. Navy F-35C Joint Strike Fighter’s troubles with catching a carrier’s arresting gear wires to the tailhook design.
Efforts to fix the problem are well underway, a top company official said.
“The good news is that it’s fairly straight forward and isolated to the hook itself,” said Tom Burbage, Lockheed program manager for the F-35 program. “It doesn’t have secondary effects going into the rest of the airplane.”


Moreover, the rest of the design of the tailhook system, which include the doors and bay that conceal the device and other ancillary hardware, is sound, Burbage said.
“What we are trying to do is make sure that we got the actual design of the hook is optimized so that it in fact repeatedly picks up the wire as long the airplane puts itself in position to do that,” he said.
A preliminary review has already been completed and was done in conjunction with the Naval Air Systems Command and F-35 Joint Program Office.
Burbage said the hook system is already being modified in accordance with the new test data.
“We’re modifying the hook to accommodate what we found so far in test,” Burbage said. “The new parts, we expect to have them back in the next couple of months.”
Tests with the newly modified tailhook should start at Lakehurst, N.J, in the second quarter of this year, Burbage said.
That will give the F-35 program another set of data to study to make sure the new design works as promised. However, until those tests are done, there is no ironclad guarantee that the redesign of the tailhook will work, but Burbage said he is confident of that the modified design will be successful.
“The big test for this airplane is not until the summer of ’13 when we take the Navy jet out to the big deck carrier and do actual traps at sea,” Burbage said.
Burbage dismisses claims that the F-35C will be unable to land on a carrier as falsehoods.
“That’s patently not true,” he said.


Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group, Fairfax, Va., said the claim that the F-35C could never land on a ship was always highly dubious.
“They turned the YF-17 into a carrier plane, why couldn’t they correct carrier-hook problems here?” he said. “This does not appear to be a killer problem.”
Flight testing is designed to uncover and fix problems with a new aircraft, Aboulafia said.
“This is the kind of problem that might come out during the flight testing of a carrier-based plane,” he said.
Aboulafia added that the F-35 is an extremely ambitious program with its three variants — technical problems are par for the course.
The reason the problem with the hook arose in the first place is because of the inherent constraints of building a stealth fighter, said Burbage. The F-35 is the first naval stealth fighter and as such, Lockheed had the unique challenge of designing the jet with a tail-hook that had to be concealed when it’s not being used.
Because the tail-hook has to fit within the outer mold line of the F-35, the device had to be fitted further forward on the jet’s ventral surface than on other naval aircraft, Burbage said. The result is that the hook behaves differently than on previous fighters like the F/A-18.
In an ideal world, an arresting-hook will catch a wire 100 percent of the time, however in the real world that doesn’t happen due to various dynamic forces, the veteran former Navy test pilot said.


In the case of the F-35, one of those dynamic forces includes the way the wires react when the jet passes over them. The wire reacts in a sine wave pattern, Burbage said. “The time differential between when the main gear rolls over the cable and the time the hook picks up the cable on a more convention airplane, there is more time for that wave to damp out,” he said. “In the case of the F-35, one of our design constraints is that hook just has to be closer to the main landing gear than on a conventional aircraft because of the requirement to hide it inside the airplane.”
Another factor that effects landing on a carrier is the sheer force of the impact from a carrier landing. Unlike conventional land-based aircraft, naval aircraft don’t flare on landing. While the landing is on a more precise spot, it causes the tail-hook to oscillate vertically- which increases the chances that it won’t catch a wire, Burbage said. The dampening of that motion has to be tweaked, he said.
The shape of the hook itself also has an effect on the probability of catching a wire, he added. All of these are being tweaked to increase the chances that the F-35C will catch a wire on a carrier’s deck.
“We’re doing a redesign of the hook to increase the probability the hook will engage the wire a high percentage of the time,” Burbage said.

Saturday, January 14, 2012

U.S. Draws Up Contingencies in Case Israel Attacks Iran: Report


WASHINGTON - The U.S. government is concerned that Israel is preparing to take military action against Iran over U.S. objections, and has stepped up contingency planning to safeguard U.S. facilities in the region, The Wall Street Journal reported Jan. 13.
The newspaper said U.S. President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and other top officials have delivered a series of private messages to Israeli leaders, warning about the dire consequences of a strike.
Obama spoke by telephone Jan. 12 with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, will meet with Israeli military officials in Tel Aviv next week, the report said.
The report said that the U.S. military was preparing for a number of possible responses to an Israeli strike, including assaults by pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Up to 15,000 U.S. diplomats, federal employees and contractors still remain in Iraq.
To help deter Iran, the United States is maintaining 15,000 troops in Kuwait, and has moved a second aircraft carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf area, the report said.

Friday, January 13, 2012

Asian Navies Shift to Bigger Vessels, Downplay Littoral Ops


TAIPEI - As Western navies build fewer aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines, Asian navies are moving in the opposite direction, ignoring the littorals with construction and procurement of larger warships and submarines.
The U.S. and Europe have stepped back from larger platforms designed for the Cold War and invested in smaller platforms such as the U.S. Navy's Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). But this is not the case in East Asia and the Pacific, where there have been increases in spending on destroyers and submarines in Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, said Bob Nugent, vice president of naval advisory services at AMI International, based in Seattle.
One of the most notable cases involves Taiwan's procurement of four Kidd-class guided missile destroyers and plans to procure eight submarines. Japan and South Korea have also invested heavily in guided missile destroyers equipped with advanced phased array radars.
Even in budget-challenged Southeast Asian countries, the trend has been a shift from smaller to larger platforms, such as frigates and large corvettes. Examples include Singapore's Formidable-class frigates, Indonesia's SIGMA-class corvettes, Malaysia's recent decision on the SGPV/LCS frigates, and Vietnam's plan to buy SIGMAs and the pending delivery of Russian-built Kilo-class submarines.
The main reason regional navies are ignoring littoral capabilities has to do with geography. In the region, "the home team enjoys an enormous advantage of range and proximity and the attacker would have to be prepared to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the coast state's bases before conducting operations in the littoral," said Sam Bateman a regional naval specialist at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, in Singapore.
The U.S. Navy should "think twice" about deploying classic sea control/power projection capabilities, such as carrier battle groups, within range of subs and land-based strike aircraft, Bateman said. The U.S. Navy's new LCS will be "hugely vulnerable without close-air support and that cannot be guaranteed."
The U.S. and Singapore have recently agreed to allow the U.S. Navy to station the LCS in Singapore.
Air support is the "elephant in the room" with littoral warfare, Bateman said. Littoral warfare is dependent on fire support directed against targets on land, either from aircraft close-air support or naval gunfire. Despite all the advances with missiles, "the big caliber naval gun remains an attractive and effective way of putting down fire in coastal areas."
Another problem in the Asia-Pacific has been increased tension over exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims, particularly in the South China Sea. Many countries, including China, claim restrictions over naval operations in their EEZs.
Some within the region have invested in stealthy vessels to avoid detection in the littoral environment. Singapore's Formidable-class frigates are based on the stealthy French-built La Fayette-class frigates and Singapore's ST Engineering is conducting research to develop the 27-meter Stealth Interceptor and 57-meter Stealth Patrol Vessel.
Taiwan wants to build a stealthy 900-ton catamaran corvette and is manufacturing a stealthy 180-ton fast-attack missile patrol boat, armed with Hsiung Feng-2 anti-ship missiles. The stealthy SIGMA-class corvettes procured by Indonesia and now being considered by Vietnam are other examples.
For Asian countries dealing with the littoral issue, the challenge is finding the right investment balance among intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and defensive and offensive technologies, Nugent said.
"Unmanned systems are critical to ISR and defense in the littoral now and will become more so for offensive littoral warfare as unmanned maritime systems are more widely armed for all domains in the future," he said. Investments in better sensors and C4ISR are the other areas where the "gaps that create vulnerabilities in ship's self-defense against missiles and torpedoes in the littoral are getting a lot of attention."
Another area of growing interest is the use of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). ST Engineering is developing the 9-meter Venus USV ostensibly for harbor patrol, but the vessel has potential for littoral warfare.
USVs and UUVs will be "particularly useful for littoral warfare as they can be launched outside the EEZ or convenient surveillance range of the coastal state, which is unlikely to have the capabilities of detecting them," Bateman said. "They can be used for surveillance/intelligence collection and as an offensive weapon - to lay mines or fire torpedoes," he said.
There is also potential for anti-submarine warfare, but that capability is as yet "unrealized."

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Would the US be defeated in the Persian Gulf in a War with Iran?


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Soldiers attend Iranian massive naval maneuvers dubbed Velayat 90 on the Sea of Oman, Iran, Dec. 28, 2011. The naval drills cover an area of 2,000 km stretching from the east of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden.
(Xinhua/Stringer/Ali Mohammadi)
After years of U.S. threats, Iran has started to take very public steps to demonstrate that it is willing and capable of closing the Strait of Hormuz. On December 24, 2011 Iran started its Velayat-90 naval drills in and around the Strait of Hormuz and extending from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (Oman Sea) to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. Since these drills took place there has been a growing war of words between Washington and Tehran. Nothing the Obama Administration or the Pentagon had done or said deterred Tehran from continuing the naval drills.
The Geo-Political Nature of the Strait of Hormuz
Besides the fact that it is a vital transit point for global energy resources and a strategic chokepoint, two additional things should be noted in regards to the Strait of Hormuz’s relationship to Iran. The first point is about the geography of the Strait of Hormuz. The second point is about the role of Iran in co-managing the strategic strait on the basis of international law and its sovereign rights.
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The maritime traffic that goes through the Strait of Hormuz has always been in contact with Iranian naval forces, which are predominately composed of the Iranian Regular Force Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy. In fact, Iranian naval forces monitor and police the Strait of Hormuz along with the Sultanate of Oman via the Omani enclave of Musandam. More importantly, to go through the Strait of Hormuz all maritime traffic, including the U.S. Navy, sails through Iranian territory. No country can enter the Persian Gulf and transit the Strait of Hormuz without sailing through Iranian waters and territory. Almost all entrances into the Persian Gulf are made through Iranian waters and most exits are through Omani waters.
Iran allows foreign ships to use its territorial waters in good faith and on the basis of Part III of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea’s maritime transit passage provisions that stipulate that vessels are free to sail through the Strait of Hormuz and similar bodies of water on the basis of speedy and continuous navigation between an open port and the high seas. Although Tehran in custom follows the navigation practices of the Law of the Sea, Tehran is not legally bound by them. Like Washington, Tehran signed this international treaty, but never ratified it.
American-Iranian Tensions in the Persian Gulf
Now the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) is re-evaluating the use of Iranian waters at the Strait of Hormuz. Legislation is being proposed by Iranian parliamentarians to block any foreign warships from being able to use Iranian territorial waters to navigate through the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian permission; the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is currently studying legislating this as an official Iranian posture on the basis of Iranian strategic interests and national security. [1]
On December 30, 2011, the U.S.S. John C. Stennispassed through the area where Iran was conducting its naval drills. The Commander of the Iranian Regular Forces, Major-General Ataollah Salehi, advised the U.S.S.John C. Stennis and other U.S. Navy vessels not to return to the Persian Gulf while Iran was doing its drills, saying that Iran is not in the habit of repeating a warning twice. [2] Shortly after the stern Iranian warning to Washington, the Pentagon’s press secretary responded by making a statement saying: “No one in this government seeks confrontation [with Iran] over the Strait of Hormuz. It’s important to lower the temperature.” [3]
In an actual scenario of military conflict with Iran it is very likely that U.S. aircraft carriers would actually operate from outside of the Persian Gulf and from the southern Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Unless the missile systems that Washington is erecting in the petro-sheikhdoms of the southern Persian Gulf are fully capable and active, the deployment of large U.S. warships may be unlikely in the Persian Gulf. The reasons for this are tied to geographic realities and the defensive capabilities of Iran.
Geography is against the Pentagon: U.S. Naval Strength has limits in the Persian Gulf
U.S. naval strength, which predominately includes the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, essentially has primacy over all the other navies and maritime forces in the world. Its deep sea or oceanic capabilities are unparalleled or unmatched by any other naval power. Nevertheless, primacy does not mean invincibility. U.S. naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are very vulnerable to Iran.
Despite its might and shear strength, geography literally works against U.S. naval power in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The relative narrowness of the Persian Gulf makes it like a channel, at least in a strategic and military context. Figuratively speaking, the aircraft carriers and warships of the U.S. are confined to narrow waters or are closed in within the coastal waters of the Persian Gulf.
This is where the Iranian military’s advanced missile capabilities come into play. The Iranian missile and torpedo arsenal would make short work of U.S. naval assets in the waters of the Persian Gulf where U.S. vessels are constricted. This is why the U.S. has been busily erecting a missile shield system in the Persian Gulf amongst the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the last few years.
Even the small Iranian patrol boats in the Persian Gulf, which appear pitiable and insignificant against a U.S. aircraft carrier or destroyer, threaten U.S. warships. Looks can be deceiving; these Iranian patrol boats can easily launch a barrage of missiles that could significantly damage and effectively sink large U.S. warships. Iranian small patrol boats are also hardly detectable and hard to target.
Iranian forces could also attack U.S. naval capabilities merely by launching missile attacks from the Iranian mainland on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf. Even in 2008 the Washington Institute for Near East Policy acknowledged the threat from Iran’s mobile coastal missile batteries, anti-ship missiles, and missile-armed small ships. [4] Other Iranian naval assets like aerial drones, hovercraft, mines, diver teams, and mini-submarines could also be used in asymmetrical naval warfare against the U.S. Fifth Fleet.
Even the Pentagon’s own war simulations have shown that a war in the Persian Gulf with Iran would spell disaster for the United States and its military. One key example is the Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) war game in the Persian Gulf, which was conducted from July 24, 2002 to August 15, 2002 and took almost two years to prepare. This mammoth drill was amongst the largest and most expensive war games ever held by the Pentagon. Millennium Challenge 2002 was held shortly after the Pentagon had decided that it would continue the momentum of the war in Afghanistan by targeting Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and finishing off with the big prize of Iran in a broad military campaign to ensure U.S. primacy in the new millennium.
After Millennium Challenge 2002 was finished, the war game was presented as a simulation of a war against Iraq under the rule of President Saddam Hussein, but this cannot be true. [5] The U.S. had already made assessments for the upcoming Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. Moreover, Iraq had no naval capabilities that would merit such large-scale use of the U.S. Navy.
Millennium Challenge 2002 was conducted to simulate a war with Iran, which was codenamed “Red” and referred to as an unknown Middle Eastern rogue enemy state in the Persian Gulf. Other than Iran, no other country could meet the perimeters and characteristics of “Red” and its military forces, from the patrol boats to the motorcycle units. The war simulation took place because Washington was planning on attacking Iran soon after invading Iraq in 2003.
The scenario in the 2002 war game started with the U.S., codenamed “Blue,” giving Iran a one-day ultimatum to surrender in the year 2007. The war game’s date of 2007 would chronologically correspond to U.S. plans to attack Iran after the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, which was suppose to expand into a broader war against Syria too. The war against Lebanon, however, did not go as planned and the U.S. and Israel realized that if Hezbollah could challenge them in Lebanon then an expanded war with Syria and Iran would be a disaster.
In Millennium Challenge 2002’s war scenario, Iran would react to U.S. aggression by launching a massive barrage of missiles that would overwhelm the U.S. and destroy sixteen U.S. naval vessels – an aircraft carrier, ten cruisers, and five amphibious ships. It is estimated that if this happened in reality, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemen would have been dead after the attack within a single day. [6] Next, Iran would send its small patrol boats – the ones that look insignificant in comparison to theU.S.S. John C. Stennis and other large U.S. warships – to overwhelm the remainder of the Pentagon’s naval forces in the Persian Gulf, which would result in the damaging and sinking of most of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the defeat of the United States. After the U.S. defeat, the war games were started over again, but “Red” had to operate under handicapping restraints so that U.S. forces would be allowed to emerge victorious from the drill. [7] This would hide the reality of the fact that the U.S. would be overwhelmed as an outcome of a conventional war with Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Hence, the formidable naval power of Washington is handicapped by geography coupled with Iranian military capabilities when it comes to fighting Tehran in the Persian Gulf or even in much of the Gulf of Oman. Without open waters, like in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. will have to fight under significantly reduced response times and, more importantly, will not be able to fight from a stand-off (militarily safe) distance. Thus, entire tool boxes of U.S. naval defensive systems, which were designed for combat in open waters using stand-off ranges, are rendered unpractical in the Persian Gulf.
Making the Strait of Hormuz Redundant to Weaken Iran?
The entire world knows the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington and its allies are very well aware that the Iranians can militarily close it for a significant period of time. This is why the U.S. has been working with the GCC countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the U.A.E. – to re-route their oil through pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and channelling GCC oil directly to the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, or Mediterranean Sea. Washington has also been pushing Iraq to seek alternative routes in talks with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Both Israel and Turkey have also been very interested in this strategic project. Ankara has had discussions with Qatar about setting up an oil terminal that would reach Turkey via Iraq. The Turkish government has attempted to get Iraq to link its southern oil fields, like Iraq’s northern oil fields, to the transit routes running through Turkey. This is all tied to Turkey’s visions of being an energy corridor and important lynchpin of transit.
The aims of re-routing oil away from the Persian Gulf would remove an important element of strategic leverage Iran has against Washington and its allies. It would effectively reduce the importance of the Strait of Hormuz. It could very well be a prerequisite to war preparations and a war led by the United States against Tehran and its allies.
It is within this framework that the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline or the Hashan-Fujairah Oil Pipeline is being fostered by the United Arab Emirates to bypass the maritime route in the Persian Gulf going through the Strait of Hormuz. The project design was put together in 2006, the contract was issued in 2007, and construction was started in 2008. [8] This pipeline goes straight from Abdu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah on the shore of the Arabian Sea. In other words it will give oil exports from the U.A.E. direct access to the Indian Ocean. It has openly been presented as a means to ensure energy security by bypassing Hormuz and attempting to avoid the Iranian military. Along with the construction of this pipeline, the erection of a strategic oil reservoir at Fujairah was also envisaged to also maintain the flow of oil to the international market should the Persian Gulf be closed off. [9]
Aside from the Petroline (East-West Saudi Pipeline), Saudi Arabia has also been looking at alternative transit routes and examining the ports of it southern neighbours in the Arabian Peninsula, Oman and Yemen. The Yemenite port of Mukalla on the shores of the Gulf of Aden has been of particular interest to Riyadh. In 2007, Israeli sources reported with some fanfare that a pipeline project was in the works that would connect the Saudi oil fields with Fujairah in the U.A.E., Muscat in Oman, and finally to Mukalla in Yemen. The reopening of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Pipeline (IPSA), which was ironically built by Saddam Hussein to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and Iran, has also been a subject of discussion for the Saudis with the Iraqi government in Baghdad.
If Syria and Lebanon were converted into Washington’s clients, then the defunct Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) could also be reactivated, along with other alternative routes going from the Arabian Peninsula to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea via the Levant. Chronologically, this would also fit into Washington’s efforts to overrun Lebanon and Syria in an attempt to isolate Iran before any possible showdown with Tehran.
The Iranian Velayat-90 naval drills, which extended in close proximity to the entrance of the Red Sea in the Gulf of Aden off the territorial waters of Yemen, also took place in the Gulf of Oman facing the coast of Oman and the eastern shores of the United Arab Emirates. Amongst other things, Velayat-90 should be understood as a signal that Tehran is ready to operate outside of the Persian Gulf and can even strike or block the pipelines trying to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
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The first Trans-Arabia pipeline designed to keep tankers out of Iran’s range.
Geography again is on Iran’s side in this case too. Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz still does not change the fact that most of the oil fields belonging to GCC countries are located in the Persian Gulf or near its shores, which means they are all situated within close proximity to Iran and therefore close Iranian striking distance. Like in the case of the Hashan-Fujairah Pipeline, the Iranians could easily disable the flow of oil from the point of origin. Tehran could launch missile and aerial attacks or deploy its ground, sea, air, and amphibious forces into these areas as well. It does not necessarily need to block the Strait of Hormuz; after all preventing the flow of energy is the main purpose of the Iranian threats.
The American-Iranian Cold War
Washington has been on the offensive against Iran using any means at its disposal. The tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf are just one front in a dangerous multi-front regional cold war between Tehran and Washington in the broader Middle East. Since 2001, the Pentagon has also been restructuring its military to wage unconventional wars with enemies like Iran. [10] Nonetheless, geography has always worked against the Pentagon and the U.S. has not found a solution for its naval dilemma in the Persian Gulf. Instead of a conventional war, Washington has had to resort to waging a covert, economic, and diplomatic war against Iran.