US Navy Conducts Test of AGM-158C-3 Anti-Ship Missiles: Ready for Deployment Against Chinese Naval Threats

The United States Navy recently conducted a significant test involving four AGM-158C-3 Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs), marking a milestone in the development of these stealth anti-ship weapons. Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer, hailed the event as a pivotal step forward in ensuring maritime security in the face of rising threats, particularly from China.

This test, part of the 12th Integrated Test Event, showcased the LRASM's formidable capabilities in terms of lethality, mission planning, and target integration. The successful demonstration met all objectives set by the US Navy, affirming the missile's readiness for deployment.

Lisbeth Vogelpohl, LRASM program director at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, emphasized the company's commitment to providing reliable and effective solutions to empower warfighters and ensure mission success.

The LRASM, belonging to the AGM-158 family, stands out for its lethal, long-range, and survivable features, making it a potent weapon against well-defended surface combatants. Its precision-guided technology allows it to engage a wide range of targets, including hostile ships, submarines, and land-based threats, with a minimum range of 200 nautical miles.

Derived from the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, the LRASM boasts advanced autonomous targeting capabilities, reducing reliance on external navigation systems in hostile environments. Its integration into various aircraft platforms, including the B-1B, F/A-18E/F, and upcoming F-35 and P-8 aircraft, underscores its versatility and strategic importance.

The US Air Force's multiyear acquisition plan for LRASMs reflects the growing recognition of its significance in countering Chinese naval aggression, particularly in potential conflicts involving Taiwan. With China's increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, long-range weapons like the LRASM are expected to play a crucial role in early-stage engagements, circumventing China's formidable anti-access/area-denial capabilities.

In addition to aircraft deployment, the LRASM's compatibility with the Mark 41 Vertical Launching System opens up possibilities for deployment on various US Navy warships, further enhancing its flexibility and reach.

As tensions escalate in the Indo-Pacific, the LRASM stands as a symbol of America's commitment to maritime security and readiness to confront emerging threats, ensuring a deterrent against potential adversaries like China. 

Enhancing F-35s for Combat: Innovative Approaches to Maintenance

Amidst the bustling activity at the U.S. Navy's largest jet base, efforts are underway to maximize the readiness of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and the expanding fleet of F-35C Joint Strike Fighters. However, concerns persist regarding the availability of F-35Cs for missions and the escalating costs associated with sustaining these aircraft.

Unlike traditional military aircraft programs, the F-35 program relies heavily on Lockheed Martin for various aspects of maintenance and management. This arrangement, overseen by the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), has limited the Navy's control over ensuring readiness. To address this challenge, the Joint Strike Fighter Wing in Lemoore is adopting innovative strategies drawn from the successful maintenance practices of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.

Following a data-driven initiative called Naval Sustainment System-Aviation, which propelled Super Hornet readiness rates to surpass 80%, the Joint Strike Fighter Wing is collaborating with F/A-18 counterparts to implement similar practices. By enhancing data collection and communication efforts, the Navy aims to improve F-35C readiness and reduce costs.

Despite these efforts, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted maintenance challenges and spare parts availability issues within the F-35 program. Unlike other aircraft programs, the F-35 lacks intermediate-level maintenance, leading to additional workload on squadrons and delays in repair times.

To address these issues, the Navy is seeking to increase its involvement in maintenance operations and streamline communication between stakeholders. By leveraging data-driven insights and adopting proven practices, the Navy aims to optimize F-35 sustainment and mitigate cost overruns.

However, challenges persist, including parts availability fluctuations and delays in standing up depot repair capabilities. The Navy is closely monitoring these issues and collaborating with industry partners to find sustainable solutions.

Amidst budget constraints, maintaining F-35C readiness is critical for naval aviation operations. Efforts to minimize mishaps, address corrosion issues, and empower squadrons to conduct maintenance are underway to enhance operational efficiency and reduce costs.

Looking ahead, the Navy and Air Force are exploring unmanned wingmen as a cost-effective solution to supplement combat aircraft capacity. Despite setbacks, the F-35 remains a vital asset in the Indo-Pacific theater, underscoring the importance of addressing readiness challenges and learning from past experiences for future programs.

Gortney named Head of U.S. Fleet Forces

. President Obama has nominated Vice Adm. Bill Gortney as the next commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, a move that if approved by the Senate would likely occur this summer.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made the announcement Monday.

Gortney, director of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, would be promoted to admiral and replace Adm. John Harvey, who has commanded what was once known as U.S. Atlantic Fleet since July 2009. Gortney reported to the Pentagon in July 2010.

Harvey, with three years on the job come summer, is expected to retire.

Naval observers and industry insiders told Navy Times in late December that Gortney appeared to have the inside track on the job, saying he possesses the right combination of experience in preparing ships and aircraft to deploy, knowledge of overseas combatant commander requirements and understanding of wartime fleet operations.

Gortney will bring extensive experience in the war theater of operations to the job; since 2002, he’s commanded Carrier Air Wing 7 and Carrier Strike Group 10, both of which operated in the Central Command area of operations, and U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain. He also has a previous hitch at Fleet Forces Command under his belt, having served as deputy chief of staff for global force management and joint operations from 2004-2006.

Gortney’s current job is his second go-round on the Joint Staff; he worked at the J-33 Joint Operations Department, Central Command Division, from 1998-1999.

That pallet of experience, particularly in the war zones, will serve him well at the helm of Fleet Forces, says retired Vice Adm. Peter Daly, chief executive officer of the U.S. Naval Institute and a former Fleet Forces deputy commander under Harvey.

“It’s very important because Fleet Forces … generates all the forces coming off the East Coast, and also has a special responsibility for standards for training all strike groups, East and West Coast,” said Daly, reached in San Diego, where USNI is holding its annual West Coast Conference and Symposium. The commander of Fleet Forces Command, Daly said, has to be someone “who understands what it takes to get there, what’s needed and what’s required when they’re at the tip of the spear. And Bill Gortney represents that.

“He’s an affable guy, but he’s no-nonsense when it comes to the warfighting piece,” Daly said. “I think he’s an excellent choice.”

In addition to its responsibilities for manning, training and equipping all Navy forces east of the Mississippi and providing same to overseas combatant commanders, Fleet Forces Command advises the chief of naval operations on all integrated warfighter capability requirements. It also handles the Navy’s anti-terrorism/force protection, individual augmentee and sea basing programs for the CNO.

Gortney is a 1977 graduate of Elon College in North Carolina. He earned a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve in September 1977 and, in December 1978, was designated as a naval aviator. He has flown more than 5,360 “mishap-free hours,” according to his official biography, and made 1,265 carrier-arrested landings, primarily in the A-7E Corsair II and the F/A-18 Hornet.

U.S. Navy Document Plans Carrier Air Wings’ Future

The U.S. Navy’s carrier air wings of tomorrow will look very different from today’s, according to a new document produced by the sea services.

By 2032, the Navy’s fleet of F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and new EA-18G Growler electronic attack jets will have begun to be replaced by new types, a new document called Naval Aviation Vision 2012 says.

The Navy will consider manned, unmanned and optionally manned aircraft to replace the long serving Rhino, as the F/A-18E/F is known to carrier deck crews. The Super Hornet will begin to reach the end of its service life around 2025 and must be replaced. The document says a competitive fly-off will be held at some point in the future.

The Super Hornet-derived EA-18G will also start being replaced by a new aircraft, but the document offers no further details.

Additionally, a new Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) is to be integrated onto the carrier deck around 2018 — possibly with four to six planes embarked. The aircraft could make use of technologies developed by the X-47B program. The Navy document calls for “balanced survivability” so that the unmanned strike plane will be effective in “specified tactical situations.”

The F-35C will serve alongside these prospective aircraft.

But the Navy isn’t going to stop with replacing just its fixed-wing assets, as the document calls for the wholesale replacement of its helicopter fleet.

The MH-60 helicopter fleet will be supplanted by a new rotary-wing aircraft. The Fire Scout unmanned helicopter will also be replaced as will the MH-53E Sea Dragon counter-mine and heavy lift helicopter. In the case of the MH-53E, a replacement aircraft needs to be operational by 2026, the document says.

The Marines will get a Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System (CRUAS) by 2032, and the service’s entire fleet of tactical remotely operated drones will be replaced. The Navy will continue to fly the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance version of the Global Hawk unmanned plane in 2032.

The training aircraft fleet will look similar to today’s, the document says. The T-6 and T-45C will soldier on, as will the TH-57 training helicopter. But the T-44 and TC-12B multi-engine turboprop trainers will be replaced with a new aircraft. The Marines’ C-20 and Navy’s C-26D and UC-12 fleets will also be replaced. As well, a new plane will take the place of the C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery plane starting in 2026.

Nor has the Navy forgotten about its fleet of F-5 and F-16 aggressor aircraft. A replacement aggressor aircraft is envisioned for 2025, according to the document.

JSF may miss acceleration Goals

The F-35 Lightning II’s transonic acceleration may not meet the requirements originally set forth for the program, a top Lockheed Martin official said.

“Based on the original spec, all three of the airplanes are challenged by that spec,” said Tom Burbage, Lockheed’s program manager for the F-35. “The cross-sectional area of the airplane with the internal weapons bays is quite a bit bigger than the airplanes we’re replacing.”

The sharp rise in wave drag at speeds between Mach 0.8 and Mach 1.2 is one of the most challenging areas for engineers to conquer. And the F-35’s relatively large cross-sectional area means, that as a simple matter of physics, the jet can’t quite match its predecessors.

“We’re dealing with the laws of physics. You have an airplane that’s a certain size, you have a wing that’s a certain size, you have an engine that’s a certain size, and that basically determines your acceleration characteristics,” Burbage said. “I think the biggest question is: are the acceleration characteristics of the airplane operationally suitable?”

A recent report by the Defense Department’s top tester, J. Michael Gilmore, says that the Navy’s F-35C model aircraft, which has larger wing and tail surfaces, is not meeting requirements for acceleration.

The report doesn’t say whether the F-35A and F-35B have hit similar snags.

Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group, Fairfax, Va., said that the revelation was not particularly surprising.

“It’s a strike fighter,” Aboulafia said. “It’s not an interceptor; it’s not an F-22.”

Aboulafia said it was unclear whether additional engine power could boost acceleration in the difficult transonic regime. So far, doubts about the aircraft’s aerodynamic performance haven’t diminished Lockheed’s sales prospects, he said.

The F-35 transonic acceleration specifications were written based on clean-configuration F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet fighter, Burbage said.

But unlike the Hornet or the F-16, the F-35 has the same configuration unloaded as it does loaded with weapons and fuel, Burbage said. When an F/A-18 or F-16 is encumbered with weapons, pylons and fuel tanks, those jets are robbed of much of their performance.

“What is different is that this airplane has accelerational characteristics with a combat load that no other airplane has, because we carry a combat load internally,” Burbage said, the F-22 Raptor notwithstanding.

Even fully loaded, the F-35’s performance doesn’t change from its unencumbered configuration, he said.

In the high subsonic range between Mach 0.6 to Mach 0.9 where the majority of air combat occurs, the F-35’s acceleration is better than almost anything flying.

Thus far, Lockheed has not had issues with the plane’s acceleration, Burbage said. There are top level Key Performance Parameters from which lower level detailed engineering specification are derived and Lockheed’s job is to meet as many of those specifications as possible within the laws of physics, he said. Discussions are underway about if those original specifications are relevant given the jet’s acceleration in a combat configuration, Burbage added.

Air Force Lt. Col. Eric Smith, director of operations at the 58th Fighter Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., and F-35 test pilot, said that flying the aircraft is a thrilling experience.

“I can’t even explain the adrenaline rush you get when you light the afterburner on that thing,” Smith said. “The acceleration is much better than an F-16.”

But the F-35’s aerodynamic performance is not what makes the jet special, Smith said. The F-35 powerful sensors and data-links and how that information is fused into a single coherent and easy to use display are what will make the jet an effective warplane.

Burbage added that while the F-35 is designed as a supersonic fighter, it’s not optimized for the extremely high supersonic speeds that the Raptor was designed to operate at.

“This is not a supercruising airplane like the F-22,” Burbage said.

F-35C Tailhook Design Blamed for Landing Issues

Lockheed Martin has traced the U.S. Navy F-35C Joint Strike Fighter’s troubles with catching a carrier’s arresting gear wires to the tailhook design.
Efforts to fix the problem are well underway, a top company official said.
“The good news is that it’s fairly straight forward and isolated to the hook itself,” said Tom Burbage, Lockheed program manager for the F-35 program. “It doesn’t have secondary effects going into the rest of the airplane.”


Moreover, the rest of the design of the tailhook system, which include the doors and bay that conceal the device and other ancillary hardware, is sound, Burbage said.
“What we are trying to do is make sure that we got the actual design of the hook is optimized so that it in fact repeatedly picks up the wire as long the airplane puts itself in position to do that,” he said.
A preliminary review has already been completed and was done in conjunction with the Naval Air Systems Command and F-35 Joint Program Office.
Burbage said the hook system is already being modified in accordance with the new test data.
“We’re modifying the hook to accommodate what we found so far in test,” Burbage said. “The new parts, we expect to have them back in the next couple of months.”
Tests with the newly modified tailhook should start at Lakehurst, N.J, in the second quarter of this year, Burbage said.
That will give the F-35 program another set of data to study to make sure the new design works as promised. However, until those tests are done, there is no ironclad guarantee that the redesign of the tailhook will work, but Burbage said he is confident of that the modified design will be successful.
“The big test for this airplane is not until the summer of ’13 when we take the Navy jet out to the big deck carrier and do actual traps at sea,” Burbage said.
Burbage dismisses claims that the F-35C will be unable to land on a carrier as falsehoods.
“That’s patently not true,” he said.


Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group, Fairfax, Va., said the claim that the F-35C could never land on a ship was always highly dubious.
“They turned the YF-17 into a carrier plane, why couldn’t they correct carrier-hook problems here?” he said. “This does not appear to be a killer problem.”
Flight testing is designed to uncover and fix problems with a new aircraft, Aboulafia said.
“This is the kind of problem that might come out during the flight testing of a carrier-based plane,” he said.
Aboulafia added that the F-35 is an extremely ambitious program with its three variants — technical problems are par for the course.
The reason the problem with the hook arose in the first place is because of the inherent constraints of building a stealth fighter, said Burbage. The F-35 is the first naval stealth fighter and as such, Lockheed had the unique challenge of designing the jet with a tail-hook that had to be concealed when it’s not being used.
Because the tail-hook has to fit within the outer mold line of the F-35, the device had to be fitted further forward on the jet’s ventral surface than on other naval aircraft, Burbage said. The result is that the hook behaves differently than on previous fighters like the F/A-18.
In an ideal world, an arresting-hook will catch a wire 100 percent of the time, however in the real world that doesn’t happen due to various dynamic forces, the veteran former Navy test pilot said.


In the case of the F-35, one of those dynamic forces includes the way the wires react when the jet passes over them. The wire reacts in a sine wave pattern, Burbage said. “The time differential between when the main gear rolls over the cable and the time the hook picks up the cable on a more convention airplane, there is more time for that wave to damp out,” he said. “In the case of the F-35, one of our design constraints is that hook just has to be closer to the main landing gear than on a conventional aircraft because of the requirement to hide it inside the airplane.”
Another factor that effects landing on a carrier is the sheer force of the impact from a carrier landing. Unlike conventional land-based aircraft, naval aircraft don’t flare on landing. While the landing is on a more precise spot, it causes the tail-hook to oscillate vertically- which increases the chances that it won’t catch a wire, Burbage said. The dampening of that motion has to be tweaked, he said.
The shape of the hook itself also has an effect on the probability of catching a wire, he added. All of these are being tweaked to increase the chances that the F-35C will catch a wire on a carrier’s deck.
“We’re doing a redesign of the hook to increase the probability the hook will engage the wire a high percentage of the time,” Burbage said.

An AirSea Battle on the Potomac

It is clear from last month's commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor that this disaster continues to impact the U.S. psyche and national strategy. "The next Pearl Harbor" has been a common theme in reports regarding 9/11.

One can assume the recently developed and classified AirSea Battle Concept has a similar vista. Addressing the "anti-access/area denial" environment, it purportedly discusses the growing influence of China and the importance of Asia to America's national interests. As the name states, air and sea power will be critical to the attainment of U.S. national interests.

While analogies to Pearl Harbor are understandable, they may be misleading on the challenges of tomorrow. A more appropriate lesson might be found in the Battle of Midway.

As the sun rose on June 4, 1942, the Imperial Navy of Japan was the most powerful navy ever to sail. By sunset, its eventual defeat was inevitable. Japan in 1942 possessed six world-class aircraft carriers and the finest naval aviators. Four carriers were lost on that day.

Lacking a robust industrial base, Japan would produce only seven additional fleet carriers by the end of the war (the U.S. more than 20). Rational or not, Japan started a war with a limited force structure and little ability to replenish loses.

Fast-forward to 2012. In a world of iPads, it is incredible, but the forces that will carry out the AirSea Battle construct reflect decisions made decades ago. Tomorrow's U.S. Air Force will possess a nominal force of bombers and a handful of sophisticated F-22s and F-35s. While highly capable, these fifth-generation fighters lack the range and payload necessary for conflicts in Asia. Friendly bases are few.

The airfields close enough for effective sortie generation rates with fifth-gen fighters will likewise be within range of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. This environment requires hardened facilities and a robust missile-defense system. The former do not exist and the latter only in limited numbers.

While U.S. naval forces will benefit from their mobility, they too will face a Chinese anti-access threat projected to acquire and target surface combatants. With a deck of F/A-18s and F-35s, our carriers will be as range-challenged as our land-based fighters. Getting the carrier to the fight will require expensive escorts to defend against missile attacks. Combat operations would quickly become problematic once the defensive armaments are depleted.

Complicating this bleak outlook is the acquisition death spiral of increased cost/reduced numbers. As weapon systems progress through the acquisition cycle, they invariably fall behind schedule from unforeseen production issues. This drives up the cost, reducing the number of systems that can be purchased. The spiral continues with the war fighter receiving fewer platforms, later than needed, and costing significantly more than planned.

These two flaws could leave the U.S. in the same position that Japan found itself in 1943, weakened and unable to reconstitute a viable force. A small fighter force will generate few effective sorties (this assumes sufficient aerial tankers. Fighters in Asia are static displays without tankers). The loss of a Nimitz-class carrier would rival Pearl Harbor in loss of life and drive our surface naval forces out of harm's way. Like Imperial Japan, a Midway debacle would cripple U.S. power projection. And like Japan of 1943, America of 2012 cannot quickly reconstitute our current weapon systems.

With senior leaders stating there are no alternatives to weapon systems currently in development, it's apparent their predecessors organized a Pickett's Charge decades ago and left the charge to them. Resolving this mismatch between force structure and strategy will require a proper focus on the challenges of combat operations in the Pacific.

Specifically, in the short term:

■ Expand procurement of standoff missiles, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range.

■ Regain our superiority in electronic warfare that was lost in our infatuation with stealth.

■ Purchase low-end attack aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles for noncontested environments.

■ Limit the F-35 buy to 200 to 400 aircraft.

For the long term:

■ Develop manned/unmanned long-range penetrating precision strike platforms (both land- and carrier-based).

■ Research and develop 21st century battleships capable of firing ballistic and cruise missiles from long range.

On June 3, 1942, the Imperial Navy of Japan was the uncontested master of the Pacific. On the following day, American ingenuity, guts and a degree of luck made Japan's eventual defeat inevitable. The future naval and air forces of the U.S. could face a similar tragedy, one in which the finest air and naval forces are rendered incapable of effective combat operations due to a 20-year process where we purchased what we wanted instead of what we needed.

Perhaps the most important contribution from an honest assessment of the AirSea Battle construct will be to own up to this unfortunate fact.

Chris Choate is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel now performing operational test and evaluation work with the service as a civilian employee. These views reflect those of the author and not the Air Force, Defense Department or U.S. government.

Future Dogfights

F-35 Wins Japan Fighter Competition

TOKYO - Japan on Dec. 20 chose the U.S.-built F-35 Joint Strike Fighter stealth jet for its next-generation mainstay fighter, as North Korea provided a timely reminder of the region's potential for instability.

U.S. AIR FORCE F-35A Joint Strike Fighters are shown in the skies over Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., in July. Japan announced Dec. 20 that it would buy the F-35A variant to replace its F-4 fleet. (Staff Sgt. Joely Santiago / U.S. Air Force)

In a deal estimated to be worth more than $4 billion, Japan went for the trouble-plagued jet to replace its aging fleet of F-4 fighters.

"The government shall acquire 42 units of F-35A after fiscal 2012 in order to replenish and to modernize the current fleet of fighters held by the Air Self-Defense Force," the cabinet said in a statement.

Lockheed Martin's F-35 beat off competition from two other jets: the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and the Eurofighter Typhoon.

The government said Japanese companies would take part in building the new fighters.

The formal decision, which had long been expected, came the day after news of the death of Kim Jong Il sent jitters through the region amid fears a power transition could destabilize North Korea's hard=line regime.

Tokyo was originally expected to announce its pick last week. The selection comes as China's massive military machine continues to grow and Beijing becomes increasingly assertive.

The F-35 is the most expensive weapons program in Pentagon history and has been plagued by cost overruns and technical delays.

Co-developed with British defense giant BAE Systems, the F-35 was the costliest of the three models under consideration, with a price tag estimated at $113 million per aircraft.

Japan initially aimed to acquire the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter to renew its fleet, but U.S. law prohibits exports of the jet and the United States has halted production of the model.

Japan, which places its security alliance with the United States at the cornerstone of its foreign policy, has long depended on U.S. manufacturers for its military hardware.

Japan F-X Announcement Due Within Hours

TOKYO - The Japanese government's sudden decision to delay the announcement of a winner in its multibillion-dollar fighter program is widely regarded as a sign that Lockheed Martin's F-35 has emerged as a late frontrunner despite concerns over cost and local workshare, according to government and industry sources.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE Fighters sit on the tarmac at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., earlier this year. Japan is scheduled to make a decision Dec. 20 on the winner of its F-X fighter competition, and some say the F-35 is the favorite. (U.S. Air Force)

Japan's National Security Council was slated to announce Dec. 16 whether the F-35, Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet or the Eurofighter Typhoon will replace about 40 Mitsubishi F-4EJ Kai Phantoms starting in early 2017 under a contract valued at about $8 billion. The announcement has been moved to Tuesday, Dec. 20.

When the F-X competition began, the aim was to buy 48 air superiority fighters with little development cost and a large share of work for Japanese industry. The F-35 was considered a long shot because development was slipping, unit costs growing, and workshare prospects were more limited.

But Tokyo began to look more favorably on the plane after Japan was denied Lockheed's stealthy F-22 and concerns about China's military escalated.

Early last week, Japan's defense establishment was thrown into a furor following local media reports that the F-35 was the likely winner.

Senior government officials denied that any decision had been made.

But one source said the Joint Strike Fighter had long ago moved to the front of the pack because government officials decided that they wanted stealth, as much high technology as possible and a good relationship with the United States.

"The Japanese always wanted the JSF," said one source. "So they ended up with the result they wanted, and now the question is whether they can sustain it."

Picking the F-35 would invite criticism from the opposition and media of the plane's cost, schedule delays and a recent spate of reports that focused on shortcomings highlighted during development.

Critics may also charge that the competition has been less transparent than claimed, although executives of the three main contenders have said the MoD has been painstakingly careful to make the contest as fair and open as possible.

The stakes in the F-X competition go beyond replacing the F-4s; the winner is likely also to get the bigger prize of replacing more than 100 F-15Js within the next 10 years.

INTERNAL SPLIT

Shinichi Kiyotani, a military analyst and journalist, said the sudden delay in the announcement points to divisions within the MoD and the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) cabinet.

"There are internal discussions within the MoD; some bureaus are sold on it [the F-35], others aren't," Kiyotani said. "There is division at the top of the MoD, and there are still internal discussions within the DPJ Cabinet. There are so many problems with the F-35, it's seen as a huge risk."

Among other concerns, there's the question of whether the F-35 will offer enough local workshare to support Japan's ailing aerospace sector. The country's only active fighter-jet assembly line is slated to shut down after rolling out just six more Mitsubishi F-2s, a derivative of the F-16.

That consideration was seen as giving the edge to Eurofighter, which vowed to give Japanese industry as much as 95 percent of the work, or to Boeing, which said that more than 80 percent would be available. Lockheed offered less, but argued that access to next-generation production capabilities and coveted stealth technology outweighed financial value.

PERCEIVED RISKS

Kiyotani also noted concerns about the recent news of a slowdown in production of the F-35 caused by some lingering technical problems and the potential that U.S. politics and budget cuts could shrink the Pentagon's own purchase.

"The F-35 is already seen as very expensive. If the number of units is only a few a year, then that will push up costs," he said. "Nobody believes the Lockheed Martin story of an eventual $65 million or so a plane."

Alessio Patalano, a Japan military expert at King's College in London, agreed on the risks involved.

"Of these three options, the F-35 is on paper the one with superior performance characteristics, but it is an operationally untested aircraft, widely reported to run into constant escalating costs and with serious issues in relation to delivery timetables," Patalano said. "More importantly, there is no way to know at the moment if its ... superior stealth capabilities will make a difference in real-time missions: By the time it will enter into service, technology will have provided new ways to reduce the impact of this feature. Second, there is little guarantee as to whether once it is fully armed, this configuration will not have an impact on its stealth capabilities."

A senior Japanese industry source speaking on condition of anonymity also said industry doesn't yet fully buy into the F-35's value proposition.

"We have not yet got concrete information of how we will be involved," the executive said. "It is said that Japanese industry will assemble substantial portions of the F-35, according to the media, but we aren't sure exactly what systems and components Lockheed Martin will be allowed to permit industry to produce in the future.

"I am afraid that delays will happen that will increase costs next year or a few years later. Some feel that it is better that we avoid such a situation. Others want to us to pursue the newest fighter like some kind of super car," he said. "If Japan doesn't get the final version of the F-35 until a decade later, we may really need a different fighter. If there are delays, then the government may well have to put up with purchasing lower numbers."

Jun Okumura, a counselor for Eurasia Group, said the Japanese government will likely opt for the F-35 based on political reasons.

"The administration [of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda] places great value on the bilateral alliance, particularly at a time when a rising China is making waves in Japan's near abroad and beyond - including hints of its own Gen-5 program - and the U.S. has decided to reupholster its engagement in the Asia-Pacific," he said. "All that the government sources are willing to say now is that nothing has been decided yet. Assuming that it is indeed the F-35, though, it means that MoD could have, but did not, go for an interim, Gen-4+ solution while waiting for the questions around the F-35, including timing, to clear up."