France Offers Heron for NATO Role

PARIS - France is offering the Heron TP as its contribution in kind to the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program, but technical and financial problems related to adapting the medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAV to French standards are holding up a deal with Dassault and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), industrial and political sources said.

DASSAULT IS NEGOTIATING with Israel Aerospace Industries on the contract for the Heron TP, which the French company would then deliver to French authorities. (Israel Aerospace Industries)

French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet told the French aerospace journalists' press club that the deal would be sealed by "the end of 2012."

Dassault is negotiating with IAI on the contract for the Heron TP, which the French company would then deliver to French authorities.That's later than expected by industry and parliamentary sources, who had thought the controversial contract would be signed before the presidential elections starting in April.

"There are many difficulties" on adapting the Heron TP, driving the cost above the 320 million euro ($408 million) budget, a parliamentary source said. An extra 150 million euros each for Dassault and Thales has been estimated for the modifications, the source said.

That would push the cost to 620 million euros, approaching the 700 million euro price tag of a previous Dassault offer of the Système de Drone MALE.

The Defense Ministry has asked Dassault to submit a technical-financial proposal on the Heron TP at the end of the month.

Among the key modifications are a satellite communications link and de-icing equipment, vital to plugging the UAV into the French - and NATO - network and fly in the northern European climate, the industry executive said.

Procurement officials are working hard to make progress on the UAV case, and one option might be to acquire the Heron TP with little or no modification, the executive said.

That might create problems of interoperability within NATO as Paris has offered the Heron TP as its asset contribution, instead of paying cash, toward maintaining the AGS system, the executive said.

Although 13 nations are acquiring AGS, based on the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk UAV, all 28 alliance members help maintain the system in return for access to AGS information.

"The AGS package is still being discussed at NATO," an alliance press officer said. "It is a topic to be discussed in the February meeting of defense ministers."

NATO has long sought to launch the AGS program, intended to provide commanders with a common operational picture.

France has had a troubled relationship with AGS, as Paris looked to gain a big technological role. The planned AGS system relies on five Global Hawks to provide radar and optical pictures of conditions the ground, and a network of transportable ground stations. The UAVs will be based at Sigonella airbase, Italy.

The choice of the Heron TP sparked resistance in the French Senate, which argued for acquisition of General Atomics' Reaper on grounds of cost, performance and interoperability with allied forces.

Longuet defended the choice of the Israeli UAV as "a compromise between capability and a long-term interest for industrial policy," he told the press club.

"We could have found a cheaper, more efficient, quicker solution, but at the [unacceptable] price of long-term dependence," he said.

Longuet denied that most of the contract value would go to IAI, saying that air vehicle is the smallest part of the system, with communication and observation more important.

The government argues that adapting the Heron TP to French needs will help develop competences among about 10 domestic companies in high-value areas, particularly in communications. Critics of the choice say there would be more work for French companies on the Reaper, pitched by EADS and General Atomics.

"No proposition was made by Reaper, which did not want to share, nor to adapt to French standards," Longuet said.

General Atomics did not make a formal offer because France did not send a letter of request, an industry executive said.

In 2010, the U.S. company signed a technical-assistance agreement with EADS detailing its offer, the executive said. The agreement listed modifications, including a communications link developed by French equipment firm Zodiac for the Harfang UAV flying in Afghanistan.

General Atomics also wrote in June 2011 to French Sens. Jacques Gautier and Daniel Reiner, setting out a $209 million offer for seven air vehicles, ground gear and service support.

The government, however, sees Dassault as holding a key position on a strategic roadmap intended to ensure interoperability in observation, surveillance, targeting and air power. That position stems from its work on the Rafale and Anglo-French cooperation, in the government's view.

Longuet said risk-reduction work on the Heron TP would start in 2013.

Dassault and DGA were unavailable for comment.

On a proposed new MALE UAV to be developed with Britain, Longuet urged a pan-European rather than a strictly bilateral approach.

The project "should accept the construction of Europe," he said. "We can't ignore countries with industrial capabilities. We'll probably have an Anglo-French project, which cannot avoid opening to other European partners."

On the Anglo-French cooperation treaty, Longuet said, a new date for a summit meeting would be set for before his birthday on Feb. 24.

"There are no doubts on defense," he said on relations between London and Paris.

EADS and Finmeccanica signed a deal in December to team on UAV development, reflecting wider discontent in Italy and Germany over the Anglo-French defense accord.

France would not develop the EADS Talarion Advanced UAV, Longuet said.

One way of bringing a European dimension into the planned Anglo-French MALE UAV would be to integrate it into the European combat aircraft environment, dominated by the Eurofighter Typhoon and Rafale aircraft, Longuet said.

"If we're intelligent, we should say, 'You British work on Eurofighter with Germany, Italy and Spain, and we'll work on Rafale,'" he said. "It would be good if the MALE UAV were to be compatible with one and the other."

OTHER PROGRAMS

France will buy the A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) from Airbus "in 2013 for delivery four years later," Longuet said, leaving Boeing out in the cold.

Longuet dismissed previous official denials that Airbus had been chosen as "semantic elegance."

The U.S. Air Force's $35 billion pick of Boeing over Airbus for its KC-X tender effectively shut the door on a French tender.

France is expected to order five to seven A330 MRTT units in a first-batch order that could total 14.

Paris had been considering leasing part of Britain's A330 tanker fleet, but the Libyan air campaign led French authorities to decide they wanted their own aircraft.

On domestic consolidation, Thales would likely take a 10 percent to 20 percent stake in Nexter in exchange for handing over its TDA Armements mortar and munitions business to the land systems specialist, Longuet said.

Thales' holding would be significant but would not leave Nexter "dependent," he said.

Answering a question on anxiety at DCNS, where Thales is raising its stake in the naval company to 35 percent from 25 percent, Longuet said, "Thales is not the obligatory supplier of systems. DCNS can choose its systems."

DCNS makes naval combat management systems, and executives fear Thales will impose its own products, relegating the company to being a platform maker.

Nexter and DCNS had to forge European alliances to compete with companies from emerging economies such as Brazil, but first they had to consolidate their domestic base, Longuet said. Nexter had to look to German partners, as that was where the land sector was strong, he said.

Asked about the health of French defense companies, Longuet said, "Thales is a company necessarily in more peril because it is innovative on creative subjects on a world scale. It is more difficult. It has to take risks and goes through periods of uncertainty."

Regarding arms exports, the 2011 total for France would be around 6.5 billion euros, helped by an Indian contract for modernization of its Mirage 2000 fighters, Longuet said. That compared with 5.12 billion in 2010.

In October, procurement chief Laurent Collet-Billon had told lawmakers in October he expected 2011 export sales to reach 7.5 billion euros.

On export prospects for the Rafale, Longuet said a UAE decision to pick the Rafale would help sell the fighter to Kuwait and Qatar, which want to be interoperable with their neighbor's Air Force.

"They are interested" but would not be the first to commit, he said. "If they think no decision is being made [by UAE], they will look elsewhere."

Kuwait is looking at acquiring 18 to 22 jet fighters, with Qatar potentially 24, industry executives said, according to La Tribune.

The Defense Ministry appeared to harbor worries about Qatar raising its stake in Lagardère, the family-controlled company which owns 7.5 percent of EADS.

"There are fewer problems in football than in military aeronautics," Longuet said. "It's a subject."

But the decision on Qatar's shareholding in Lagardère was up to the Finance Ministry, not the Defense Ministry, he said.

A Qatari sovereign fund holds 10.07 percent of Lagardère stock, making it the largest single stockholder in the French company, and has asked for a seat on the board. Qatar bought 70 percent of the Paris Saint Germain football club for 30 million euros in May.

Julian Hale in Brussels and Tom Kington in Rome contributed to this report.

Would the US be defeated in the Persian Gulf in a War with Iran?

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Soldiers attend Iranian massive naval maneuvers dubbed Velayat 90 on the Sea of Oman, Iran, Dec. 28, 2011. The naval drills cover an area of 2,000 km stretching from the east of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden.

(Xinhua/Stringer/Ali Mohammadi)

After years of U.S. threats, Iran has started to take very public steps to demonstrate that it is willing and capable of closing the Strait of Hormuz. On December 24, 2011 Iran started its Velayat-90 naval drills in and around the Strait of Hormuz and extending from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (Oman Sea) to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. Since these drills took place there has been a growing war of words between Washington and Tehran. Nothing the Obama Administration or the Pentagon had done or said deterred Tehran from continuing the naval drills.

The Geo-Political Nature of the Strait of Hormuz

Besides the fact that it is a vital transit point for global energy resources and a strategic chokepoint, two additional things should be noted in regards to the Strait of Hormuz’s relationship to Iran. The first point is about the geography of the Strait of Hormuz. The second point is about the role of Iran in co-managing the strategic strait on the basis of international law and its sovereign rights.

Source : http://www.marketoracle.co.uk

The maritime traffic that goes through the Strait of Hormuz has always been in contact with Iranian naval forces, which are predominately composed of the Iranian Regular Force Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy. In fact, Iranian naval forces monitor and police the Strait of Hormuz along with the Sultanate of Oman via the Omani enclave of Musandam. More importantly, to go through the Strait of Hormuz all maritime traffic, including the U.S. Navy, sails through Iranian territory. No country can enter the Persian Gulf and transit the Strait of Hormuz without sailing through Iranian waters and territory. Almost all entrances into the Persian Gulf are made through Iranian waters and most exits are through Omani waters.

Iran allows foreign ships to use its territorial waters in good faith and on the basis of Part III of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea’s maritime transit passage provisions that stipulate that vessels are free to sail through the Strait of Hormuz and similar bodies of water on the basis of speedy and continuous navigation between an open port and the high seas. Although Tehran in custom follows the navigation practices of the Law of the Sea, Tehran is not legally bound by them. Like Washington, Tehran signed this international treaty, but never ratified it.

American-Iranian Tensions in the Persian Gulf

Now the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) is re-evaluating the use of Iranian waters at the Strait of Hormuz. Legislation is being proposed by Iranian parliamentarians to block any foreign warships from being able to use Iranian territorial waters to navigate through the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian permission; the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is currently studying legislating this as an official Iranian posture on the basis of Iranian strategic interests and national security. [1]

On December 30, 2011, the U.S.S. John C. Stennispassed through the area where Iran was conducting its naval drills. The Commander of the Iranian Regular Forces, Major-General Ataollah Salehi, advised the U.S.S.John C. Stennis and other U.S. Navy vessels not to return to the Persian Gulf while Iran was doing its drills, saying that Iran is not in the habit of repeating a warning twice. [2] Shortly after the stern Iranian warning to Washington, the Pentagon’s press secretary responded by making a statement saying: “No one in this government seeks confrontation [with Iran] over the Strait of Hormuz. It’s important to lower the temperature.” [3]

In an actual scenario of military conflict with Iran it is very likely that U.S. aircraft carriers would actually operate from outside of the Persian Gulf and from the southern Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Unless the missile systems that Washington is erecting in the petro-sheikhdoms of the southern Persian Gulf are fully capable and active, the deployment of large U.S. warships may be unlikely in the Persian Gulf. The reasons for this are tied to geographic realities and the defensive capabilities of Iran.

Geography is against the Pentagon: U.S. Naval Strength has limits in the Persian Gulf

U.S. naval strength, which predominately includes the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, essentially has primacy over all the other navies and maritime forces in the world. Its deep sea or oceanic capabilities are unparalleled or unmatched by any other naval power. Nevertheless, primacy does not mean invincibility. U.S. naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are very vulnerable to Iran.

Despite its might and shear strength, geography literally works against U.S. naval power in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The relative narrowness of the Persian Gulf makes it like a channel, at least in a strategic and military context. Figuratively speaking, the aircraft carriers and warships of the U.S. are confined to narrow waters or are closed in within the coastal waters of the Persian Gulf.

This is where the Iranian military’s advanced missile capabilities come into play. The Iranian missile and torpedo arsenal would make short work of U.S. naval assets in the waters of the Persian Gulf where U.S. vessels are constricted. This is why the U.S. has been busily erecting a missile shield system in the Persian Gulf amongst the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the last few years.

Even the small Iranian patrol boats in the Persian Gulf, which appear pitiable and insignificant against a U.S. aircraft carrier or destroyer, threaten U.S. warships. Looks can be deceiving; these Iranian patrol boats can easily launch a barrage of missiles that could significantly damage and effectively sink large U.S. warships. Iranian small patrol boats are also hardly detectable and hard to target.

Iranian forces could also attack U.S. naval capabilities merely by launching missile attacks from the Iranian mainland on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf. Even in 2008 the Washington Institute for Near East Policy acknowledged the threat from Iran’s mobile coastal missile batteries, anti-ship missiles, and missile-armed small ships. [4] Other Iranian naval assets like aerial drones, hovercraft, mines, diver teams, and mini-submarines could also be used in asymmetrical naval warfare against the U.S. Fifth Fleet.

Even the Pentagon’s own war simulations have shown that a war in the Persian Gulf with Iran would spell disaster for the United States and its military. One key example is the Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) war game in the Persian Gulf, which was conducted from July 24, 2002 to August 15, 2002 and took almost two years to prepare. This mammoth drill was amongst the largest and most expensive war games ever held by the Pentagon. Millennium Challenge 2002 was held shortly after the Pentagon had decided that it would continue the momentum of the war in Afghanistan by targeting Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and finishing off with the big prize of Iran in a broad military campaign to ensure U.S. primacy in the new millennium.

After Millennium Challenge 2002 was finished, the war game was presented as a simulation of a war against Iraq under the rule of President Saddam Hussein, but this cannot be true. [5] The U.S. had already made assessments for the upcoming Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. Moreover, Iraq had no naval capabilities that would merit such large-scale use of the U.S. Navy.

Millennium Challenge 2002 was conducted to simulate a war with Iran, which was codenamed “Red” and referred to as an unknown Middle Eastern rogue enemy state in the Persian Gulf. Other than Iran, no other country could meet the perimeters and characteristics of “Red” and its military forces, from the patrol boats to the motorcycle units. The war simulation took place because Washington was planning on attacking Iran soon after invading Iraq in 2003.

The scenario in the 2002 war game started with the U.S., codenamed “Blue,” giving Iran a one-day ultimatum to surrender in the year 2007. The war game’s date of 2007 would chronologically correspond to U.S. plans to attack Iran after the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, which was suppose to expand into a broader war against Syria too. The war against Lebanon, however, did not go as planned and the U.S. and Israel realized that if Hezbollah could challenge them in Lebanon then an expanded war with Syria and Iran would be a disaster.

In Millennium Challenge 2002’s war scenario, Iran would react to U.S. aggression by launching a massive barrage of missiles that would overwhelm the U.S. and destroy sixteen U.S. naval vessels – an aircraft carrier, ten cruisers, and five amphibious ships. It is estimated that if this happened in reality, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemen would have been dead after the attack within a single day. [6] Next, Iran would send its small patrol boats – the ones that look insignificant in comparison to theU.S.S. John C. Stennis and other large U.S. warships – to overwhelm the remainder of the Pentagon’s naval forces in the Persian Gulf, which would result in the damaging and sinking of most of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the defeat of the United States. After the U.S. defeat, the war games were started over again, but “Red” had to operate under handicapping restraints so that U.S. forces would be allowed to emerge victorious from the drill. [7] This would hide the reality of the fact that the U.S. would be overwhelmed as an outcome of a conventional war with Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Hence, the formidable naval power of Washington is handicapped by geography coupled with Iranian military capabilities when it comes to fighting Tehran in the Persian Gulf or even in much of the Gulf of Oman. Without open waters, like in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. will have to fight under significantly reduced response times and, more importantly, will not be able to fight from a stand-off (militarily safe) distance. Thus, entire tool boxes of U.S. naval defensive systems, which were designed for combat in open waters using stand-off ranges, are rendered unpractical in the Persian Gulf.

Making the Strait of Hormuz Redundant to Weaken Iran?

The entire world knows the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington and its allies are very well aware that the Iranians can militarily close it for a significant period of time. This is why the U.S. has been working with the GCC countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the U.A.E. – to re-route their oil through pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and channelling GCC oil directly to the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, or Mediterranean Sea. Washington has also been pushing Iraq to seek alternative routes in talks with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

Both Israel and Turkey have also been very interested in this strategic project. Ankara has had discussions with Qatar about setting up an oil terminal that would reach Turkey via Iraq. The Turkish government has attempted to get Iraq to link its southern oil fields, like Iraq’s northern oil fields, to the transit routes running through Turkey. This is all tied to Turkey’s visions of being an energy corridor and important lynchpin of transit.

The aims of re-routing oil away from the Persian Gulf would remove an important element of strategic leverage Iran has against Washington and its allies. It would effectively reduce the importance of the Strait of Hormuz. It could very well be a prerequisite to war preparations and a war led by the United States against Tehran and its allies.

It is within this framework that the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline or the Hashan-Fujairah Oil Pipeline is being fostered by the United Arab Emirates to bypass the maritime route in the Persian Gulf going through the Strait of Hormuz. The project design was put together in 2006, the contract was issued in 2007, and construction was started in 2008. [8] This pipeline goes straight from Abdu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah on the shore of the Arabian Sea. In other words it will give oil exports from the U.A.E. direct access to the Indian Ocean. It has openly been presented as a means to ensure energy security by bypassing Hormuz and attempting to avoid the Iranian military. Along with the construction of this pipeline, the erection of a strategic oil reservoir at Fujairah was also envisaged to also maintain the flow of oil to the international market should the Persian Gulf be closed off. [9]

Aside from the Petroline (East-West Saudi Pipeline), Saudi Arabia has also been looking at alternative transit routes and examining the ports of it southern neighbours in the Arabian Peninsula, Oman and Yemen. The Yemenite port of Mukalla on the shores of the Gulf of Aden has been of particular interest to Riyadh. In 2007, Israeli sources reported with some fanfare that a pipeline project was in the works that would connect the Saudi oil fields with Fujairah in the U.A.E., Muscat in Oman, and finally to Mukalla in Yemen. The reopening of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Pipeline (IPSA), which was ironically built by Saddam Hussein to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and Iran, has also been a subject of discussion for the Saudis with the Iraqi government in Baghdad.

If Syria and Lebanon were converted into Washington’s clients, then the defunct Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) could also be reactivated, along with other alternative routes going from the Arabian Peninsula to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea via the Levant. Chronologically, this would also fit into Washington’s efforts to overrun Lebanon and Syria in an attempt to isolate Iran before any possible showdown with Tehran.

The Iranian Velayat-90 naval drills, which extended in close proximity to the entrance of the Red Sea in the Gulf of Aden off the territorial waters of Yemen, also took place in the Gulf of Oman facing the coast of Oman and the eastern shores of the United Arab Emirates. Amongst other things, Velayat-90 should be understood as a signal that Tehran is ready to operate outside of the Persian Gulf and can even strike or block the pipelines trying to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

The first Trans-Arabia pipeline designed to keep tankers out of Iran’s range.

Geography again is on Iran’s side in this case too. Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz still does not change the fact that most of the oil fields belonging to GCC countries are located in the Persian Gulf or near its shores, which means they are all situated within close proximity to Iran and therefore close Iranian striking distance. Like in the case of the Hashan-Fujairah Pipeline, the Iranians could easily disable the flow of oil from the point of origin. Tehran could launch missile and aerial attacks or deploy its ground, sea, air, and amphibious forces into these areas as well. It does not necessarily need to block the Strait of Hormuz; after all preventing the flow of energy is the main purpose of the Iranian threats.

The American-Iranian Cold War

Washington has been on the offensive against Iran using any means at its disposal. The tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf are just one front in a dangerous multi-front regional cold war between Tehran and Washington in the broader Middle East. Since 2001, the Pentagon has also been restructuring its military to wage unconventional wars with enemies like Iran. [10] Nonetheless, geography has always worked against the Pentagon and the U.S. has not found a solution for its naval dilemma in the Persian Gulf. Instead of a conventional war, Washington has had to resort to waging a covert, economic, and diplomatic war against Iran.

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya

Pakistan Defense Secretary Fired Over Army Row

ISLAMABAD - Pakistan's army warned Jan. 11 of "grievous consequences" for the country over criticism by the prime minister that has ramped up tensions between the military and civilian leadership.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani immediately sacked the top bureaucrat in the defense ministry over the row, with the government saying the official had been the cause of the "misunderstanding" with the military.

The spat centers on a Supreme Court inquiry set up to investigate a controversial unsigned memo allegedly delivered to the U.S. military seeking its help in curbing Pakistan's highly powerful armed forces in May.

In an unusually bold interview with Chinese media earlier this week, Gilani accused the army and intelligence chiefs of failing to make their submissions to the commission through government channels.

The army issued a statement on Jan. 11 vociferously denying Gilani's accusation and saying it had passed its response through the defense ministry to the court in accordance with the law.

"There can be no allegation more serious than what the honorable prime minister has leveled against COAS (army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani) and DG ISI (spy chief Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha) and has unfortunately charged the officers for violation of the constitution of the country," the army's statement said. "This has very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country."

Kayani returned on Jan. 10 from China and met on Jan. 11 with the head of Myanmar's air force in Rawalpindi.

Pakistan has seen three military coups since independence in 1947. It has spent about half of its life under military dictatorships.

The current civilian administration headed by Zardari has lurched from crisis to crisis since coming to power in 2008 following elections held a month after the assassination of his wife, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

Defense secretary Naeem Khalid Lodhi was fired over what the government called a "misunderstanding" between Gilani and the top brass caused by his failure to pass court submissions through the prime minister's office.

"Prime minister has terminated the contract of defense secretary Naeem Khalid Lodhi for gross misconduct," a senior government official told AFP.

The army's statement cast doubt on the government's claim and said that Gilani had issued a press release last month apparently approving the army's replies to the court as being made "through proper channel."

The statement also defended submissions made to the memo inquiry as in accordance with the military's obligation to "state the facts."

The highly controversial memo was allegedly an attempt by President Asif Ali Zardari through Husain Haqqani - a close aide and then-ambassador to the United States - to enlist help from the U.S. military to head off a feared coup in Pakistan.

American businessman Mansoor Ijaz has claimed that Zardari reportedly feared that the military might seize power in a bid to limit the hugely damaging fallout after U.S. Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May.

Tension between the army and Zardari's weak civilian administration soared over the note, allegedly delivered to then-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen in May and made public by Ijaz in October.

Pakistan's Supreme Court last week decided to set up a judicial commission to investigate the matter and Pasha, the head of the ISI intelligence agency, has called for a "forensic examination" of the memo.

Haqqani has already resigned over the affair and the court has stopped him from leaving Pakistan. At the second meeting of the commission held on Jan. 9, he repeated his denial of any involvement in the scandal.

The commission, being held in Islamabad, is to meet again on Jan. 16 and is expected to submit its findings within four weeks.

The probe puts fresh pressure on the president, who visited Dubai in December over health fears, with most observers expecting early elections sometime in 2012.

Qatar, Kuwait Await UAE's Move on Rafale

PARIS - Qatar and Kuwait are interested in buying French Rafale fighter jets but are waiting to see whether the United Arab Emirates will make a purchase first, France's defense minister said Jan. 9.

"They are, in effect, interested but they won't know for sure until the first one jumps in," minister Gerard Longuet said, adding that he hoped the UAE, which is talks with France to buy 60 Rafales, would make a decision "within a time frame that will allow its two neighbors, which hope to be interoperable with the Emirates, to make decisions."

Industry experts have estimated that Kuwait needs 18 to 22 new fighter jets and that Qatar needs 24.

After opening talks on the purchase in 2008, the UAE said in November that the offer for Rafales from France's Dassault Aviation was uncompetitive and opened up the tender to competition.

France has raised concerns over the future of the Rafale program, which has struggled to find foreign buyers to support a project that has so far cost more than 40 billion euros ($51 billion).

Longuet warned in December that production on the multirole fighter could halt if it remains unable to sell any abroad.

U.K. Defense Chief Urges U.S. To Maintain Tight NATO Ties

LONDON and WASHINGTON - Just before the Pentagon unveiled a new military strategy that emphasizes a shift in focus toward the Asia-Pacific region, Britain's Defense Secretary Phillip Hammond urged the U.S. government to maintain the strength of its commitment to the NATO alliance.

Speaking Jan. 5 in Washington on his first visit to the United States since taking over for Liam Fox in October, Hammond said that "however pressing the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region is to the United States, the alliance between the U.S. and the countries of Europe is, and will remain, of vital interest to both continents."

Hammond said the growth in power and influence of other regions is a reason to strengthen the NATO alliance rather than weaken it.

The speech to an audience at the Atlantic Council, an organization formed to promote trans-Atlantic cooperation, was delivered right before U.S. President Barack Obama took the stage in the Pentagon briefing room to announce a new strategy that envisions a smaller military with resources increasingly devoted to the Pacific.

The eight-page strategy document says the United States remains committed to "bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO," but it also acknowledges that the strategic landscape in Europe has changed since NATO was first created and therefore the U.S. military posture must also evolve.

"Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it," the document says. "Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities."

Hammond said he planned to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Leon Panetta, later that afternoon to discuss the new defense posture and the impact of the U.S. military spending cuts on trans-Atlantic relations.

The strategy did not say how many U.S. troops could leave Europe, but some reports indicate 4,000 more may withdraw.

"Of course reductions in U.S. troop numbers are not going to be welcomed by European allies, but I think we all understand the budget pressure the United States, like all of us, is under," Hammond said.

NATO members also recognize the world is changing and that the United States may have to shift its strategic focus, he said.

"I think Europe needs to respond in a mature way, not in a histrionic way," he said.

The release of the strategy document did not include new programmatic details, including any information on potential changes to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon's largest and most expensive weapon program. The United Kingdom plans to buy the naval variant of the aircraft.

Hammond said he is particularly concerned with what a delay to the program's schedule or a reduction to the U.S. buy could do to the aircraft's unit cost and availability.

"We're already under some pressure from public opinion in the United Kingdom that we're going to have built and launched [aircraft] carriers some years before we have the aircraft to fly off them," he said.

His speech served to remind the United States of the importance of NATO as it makes its strategic transition toward Asia.

At the same time, Hammond wanted to address comments made by Panetta and former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who have both been critical of the unbalanced resources some European countries provide NATO and its operations.

Although Afghanistan and Libya had shown what the alliance was capable of, the contributions of many alliance members fell short "in terms of capability, the balance of contributions and in terms of the will to deploy."

In June, Gates said NATO had become a two-tiered alliance with some members shouldering the costs and participating in combat missions, while others enjoy the benefits of NATO membership without footing the bill or participating in difficult operations.

Despite these shortcomings, Hammond said people need to be realistic.

"Without strong economies and stable public finances, it is impossible to build and sustain in the long term the military capability required to project power and maintain defense," he said. "That is why today the debt crisis should probably be regarded as the greatest strategic threat to our nations."

With defense budgets continuing to be cut by NATO members, he warned the situation would get worse before it got better.

"Across the alliance, aggregate defense expenditure is certain to fall in the short term and, at best, recover slowly in the medium term," Hammond said.

Part of the answer to NATO's capability woes in a time of austerity lies in a series of capacity enhancing measures. He recommended a thorough assessment of NATO's capabilities and then stacking these against its current ambitions.

Such an analysis would provide the basis for choices regarding "greater pooling and sharing of capabilities; mission, role and geographic specialization; greater sharing of technology; cooperation on logistics; alignment of research-and-development programs, and more collaborative training."

The strategy document released by the Pentagon hinted at a similar approach.

"In this resource-constrained era, we will also work with NATO allies to develop a 'Smart Defense' approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st century challenges," it says.

Without more money, Hammond said the challenge was to maximize existing NATO capability.

"Prioritizing ruthlessly, specializing aggressively and collaborating unsentimentally. ... With budgets so tight, allies need to revisit approaches and ideas that might previously have seemed politically unacceptable," said Hammond.

Hammond also argued for greater cooperation with allies outside of NATO, naming Sweden, Australia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and South Korea.

However, he said he is opposed to growing the alliance and rejected the idea that the European Union should be a member.