Showing posts with label Missile. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Missile. Show all posts

Sunday, January 15, 2012

U.S., Israel Postpone Joint Missile Exercises


JERUSALEM - Israel and the United States have agreed to postpone a major military defence exercise scheduled for spring, a senior security official Jan. 15 Sunday, amid rising regional tension over Iran's nuclear programme.
"Israel and the United States have agreed to postpone the maneuver planned for spring," the official said on condition of anonymity.
"The exercises will take place between now and the end of 2012," the official added, without elaborating.
Earlier, public radio said the "Austere Challenge 12" exercise would be pushed back to the end of 2012 over unspecified budgetary concerns, citing military sources.
Israeli Army radio, citing a defense official, said it was being postponed to avoid "unnecessary headlines in such a tense period."
The joint maneuver was to have been the biggest yet between the two allies and was seen as an opportunity to display their joint military strength at a time of growing concern about Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
Israel, the United States and much of the international community accuse Iran of using its nuclear program to mask a weapons drive, a charge Tehran denies.
The postponement appeared to suggest fears the exercise could dangerously ramp up regional tensions, at a time when Iran has already threatened to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz - a chokepoint for one fifth of the world's traded oil - in the event of a military strike or severe tightening of international sanctions over its nuclear program.
Meanwhile, the United States sent Iran a letter over its threatened closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman said Jan. 15, without revealing the letter's contents.
"The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Susan Rice, sent a letter to Mohammad Khazaie, Iran's U.N. representative, which was conveyed by the Swiss ambassador, and finally Iraqi President Jalal Talabani delivered its contents to officials" in Iran, the official IRNA news agency quoted Ramin Mehmanparast as saying.
"We are in the process of studying the letter and if necessary we will respond."
Last month, the Israelis insisted the joint maneuvers were planned in advance and denied they were related to Iran.
"The exercise scenario involves notional, simulated events as well as some field training and is not in response to any real-world event," the military said.
The postponement was not expected to affect a visit to Israel by top U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, who is scheduled to arrive this week and meet with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz.
But the delay was announced as reports suggested unease in U.S.-Israeli relations over the best response to Iran's nuclear program, and after an Israeli official voiced "disappointment" at Washington's approach.
Washington has spearheaded a push for international sanctions against Iran, including on its oil exports and financial institutions.
But Israel's Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Yaalon told public radio he thought U.S. President Barack Obama's administration should be tougher.
"France and Britain understand that the sanctions must be strengthened, in particular against the Iranian Central Bank," Yaalon said. "The U.S. Senate is also in favor, but the U.S. government is hesitating, fearing higher oil prices in an election year. It's disappointing."
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, speaking Jan. 15 ahead of a trip to Britain, also accused the international community of dragging its feet.
"It is regrettable that the international community has not yet used all the means at its disposal to stop the Iranian nuclear program," he told public radio.
Israel has made no secret of its desire to see crippling sanctions imposed on Iran in a bid to slow its nuclear development, and reports suggest it has also taken other actions to delay the program.
The Jewish state is suspected of involvement both in a computer worm that reportedly set back Iran's nuclear efforts, as well as a campaign of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.
Media reports have pointed the finger at Israel's intelligence agency Mossad.
Foreign Policy magazine reported that Israel's actions had created friction with Washington, and The Wall Street Journal reported Jan. 13 that U.S. officials had warned Israel against unilateral military action against Iran.
Yaalon said Jan. 15 that a military strike remained a last resort for Israel.
"Israel must defend itself. I hope that we will not arrive at that point," he said.

Friday, January 13, 2012

India Casts Wider Net for Short-Range Missiles


NEW DELHI - The Indian Army has entered the global market to buy short-range surface-to-air missile (SRSAM) systems for $1.5 billion, a move that could further undercut a four-year effort to develop a system with MBDA of France.
The Army convinced the Indian Defence Ministry there is an urgent requirement for SRSAM, said Army sources, and did not want to wait for the Maitri project conceived four years ago. India and France have not been able to agree on details of the Maitri project, including funding arrangements, the source added.
The Army last month sent global tenders to defense companies in Europe, the United States and Russia including Raytheon of the U.S., Israel's Rafael, MBDA and Thales of France, Diehl Defence of Germany, KBP Tula and Rosoboronexport of Russia, Ukraineexport of Ukraine and LIG NEX1 of South Korea.
The requirements of the SRSAM are similar to those of the proposed Indo-French Maitri project, the Army source said.
The current tender is for two regiments (36 systems, 1,000 missiles) estimated to cost about $800 million each. The total Indian Army requirement is likely to be about eight regiments in the next five to seven years.
The Maitri project was proposed to be jointly developed by India's Defence Research and Development Laboratory and MBDA.
The selected vendor will have to transfer technology of the systems, as well.
The supply will be made in two batches and completed within five years of the signing of the tender, including the launchers, sensors, vehicles for transportation and the missiles. The system must have a service life of at least 20 years and the missiles of not less than eight years.
The SRSAM system should be able to engage multiple targets, including those flying up to 500 meters per second, and have a maximum range of not less than 15 kilometers.
In 2009, India bought two regiments of Spyder quick-reaction surface-to-air missile systems from Rafael. Another Indo-Israeli joint project is the $2.5 billion long-range surface-to-air missile project signed in 2009 and expected to be inducted in 2013, Indian Defence Ministry sources said.
Meanwhile, the Indian Army has begun inducting the homemade medium-range Akash, which has a range of up to 30 kilometers. In 2011, the Indian Army ordered the induction of two Akash regiments at a cost of about $3 billion.
The Army also has been negotiating the purchase of David Sling and Iron Dome missile interceptor systems.

Asian Navies Shift to Bigger Vessels, Downplay Littoral Ops


TAIPEI - As Western navies build fewer aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines, Asian navies are moving in the opposite direction, ignoring the littorals with construction and procurement of larger warships and submarines.
The U.S. and Europe have stepped back from larger platforms designed for the Cold War and invested in smaller platforms such as the U.S. Navy's Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). But this is not the case in East Asia and the Pacific, where there have been increases in spending on destroyers and submarines in Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, said Bob Nugent, vice president of naval advisory services at AMI International, based in Seattle.
One of the most notable cases involves Taiwan's procurement of four Kidd-class guided missile destroyers and plans to procure eight submarines. Japan and South Korea have also invested heavily in guided missile destroyers equipped with advanced phased array radars.
Even in budget-challenged Southeast Asian countries, the trend has been a shift from smaller to larger platforms, such as frigates and large corvettes. Examples include Singapore's Formidable-class frigates, Indonesia's SIGMA-class corvettes, Malaysia's recent decision on the SGPV/LCS frigates, and Vietnam's plan to buy SIGMAs and the pending delivery of Russian-built Kilo-class submarines.
The main reason regional navies are ignoring littoral capabilities has to do with geography. In the region, "the home team enjoys an enormous advantage of range and proximity and the attacker would have to be prepared to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the coast state's bases before conducting operations in the littoral," said Sam Bateman a regional naval specialist at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, in Singapore.
The U.S. Navy should "think twice" about deploying classic sea control/power projection capabilities, such as carrier battle groups, within range of subs and land-based strike aircraft, Bateman said. The U.S. Navy's new LCS will be "hugely vulnerable without close-air support and that cannot be guaranteed."
The U.S. and Singapore have recently agreed to allow the U.S. Navy to station the LCS in Singapore.
Air support is the "elephant in the room" with littoral warfare, Bateman said. Littoral warfare is dependent on fire support directed against targets on land, either from aircraft close-air support or naval gunfire. Despite all the advances with missiles, "the big caliber naval gun remains an attractive and effective way of putting down fire in coastal areas."
Another problem in the Asia-Pacific has been increased tension over exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims, particularly in the South China Sea. Many countries, including China, claim restrictions over naval operations in their EEZs.
Some within the region have invested in stealthy vessels to avoid detection in the littoral environment. Singapore's Formidable-class frigates are based on the stealthy French-built La Fayette-class frigates and Singapore's ST Engineering is conducting research to develop the 27-meter Stealth Interceptor and 57-meter Stealth Patrol Vessel.
Taiwan wants to build a stealthy 900-ton catamaran corvette and is manufacturing a stealthy 180-ton fast-attack missile patrol boat, armed with Hsiung Feng-2 anti-ship missiles. The stealthy SIGMA-class corvettes procured by Indonesia and now being considered by Vietnam are other examples.
For Asian countries dealing with the littoral issue, the challenge is finding the right investment balance among intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and defensive and offensive technologies, Nugent said.
"Unmanned systems are critical to ISR and defense in the littoral now and will become more so for offensive littoral warfare as unmanned maritime systems are more widely armed for all domains in the future," he said. Investments in better sensors and C4ISR are the other areas where the "gaps that create vulnerabilities in ship's self-defense against missiles and torpedoes in the littoral are getting a lot of attention."
Another area of growing interest is the use of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). ST Engineering is developing the 9-meter Venus USV ostensibly for harbor patrol, but the vessel has potential for littoral warfare.
USVs and UUVs will be "particularly useful for littoral warfare as they can be launched outside the EEZ or convenient surveillance range of the coastal state, which is unlikely to have the capabilities of detecting them," Bateman said. "They can be used for surveillance/intelligence collection and as an offensive weapon - to lay mines or fire torpedoes," he said.
There is also potential for anti-submarine warfare, but that capability is as yet "unrealized."

Russian Ship Heads to Syria with Weapons: Report


ST. PETERSBURG, Russia - A Russian ship carrying a "dangerous cargo" has sailed for Syria after a brief stopover in Cyprus, despite a pledge reportedly given to Cypriot authorities, the vessel's owner said Jan. 13.
An independent Russian military analyst separately reported that the ship was likely to dock at the Syrian port of Tartus with what media said may be up to 60 ton of ammunition supplied by the state Russian arms exporter.
The Cypriot foreign ministry said Jan. 11 the Saint Vincent-flagged cargo ship was allowed to refuel and set sail from the port of Limassol after its Russian owners agreed to change the destinationfrom Syria.
Cyprus inspectors said the ship's documents showed Turkey as an alternative destination point.
But the vessel's St. Petersburg-based operator Westberg Ltd said the Chariot decided to keep to its original schedule after leaving the Cyprus port.
"It was classified as a dangerous cargo, but that could really mean anything. We are not responsible for knowing what was inside the crates," a source at the shipping company told AFP.
The source refused to confirm a Russian state media report saying the cargo was being shipped by the state arms export agency Rosoboronexport through a freight company called Balchart.
Both Rosoboronexport and Balchart declined to comment when contacted by AFP.
But the respected Russian shipping analyst Mikhail Voitenko said on his Maritime Bulletin website on Jan. 12 that the Chariot had taken a direct course for the port of Tartus where Russia has a naval base.
He added that the ship's precise current location could not be determined because it had switched off its international tracking device about half way between Cyprus and Syria.
Moscow has defended Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad against global pressure and has argued that its ongoing arms sales were permitted under international law and would continue.
A Russian military source said on Dec. 1 that Moscow had delivered supersonic cruise missiles to Syria that protect the Arab state's shoreline against a naval attack.

N. Korea Test-Fires Short-Range Missiles: Official


SEOUL, South Korea - North Korea test-fired three short-range missiles off its east coast this week in an apparently routine exercise, a South Korean official said Jan. 13.
The North lobbed what appeared to be KN-02 missiles with a range of 75 miles into the Sea of Japan on Jan. 11, the defense ministry official said on condition of anonymity.
The North frequently conducts such short-range tests, but their timing sometimes coincides with periods of tension.
It reportedly test-fired two short-range missiles off its east coast on Dec. 19, the same day it announced the death of leader Kim Jong-Il.
Kim's son Kim Jong-Un has been proclaimed supreme leader and has been officially appointed commander of the 1.2-million-strong military.
The North has stressed that its stance will not change under its new young chief and that the "songun," or military-first, policy will continue.
On Jan. 8 state media showed Kim Jong Un driving a tank and giving orders to artillery, navy and air force units in an apparent attempt to bolster his credentials with the world's fourth-largest armed forces.
The following day the military held a mass rally and vowed to become human "rifles and bombs" to protect him.

Russia Open to NATO Defense Cooperation: Official


BRUSSELS - Russia's outgoing permanent representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has pointed to the country's openness to defense cooperation with NATO partners at a press conference at NATO headquarters on Jan. 13.
"We should abandon any political confrontation [between NATO and Russia]," he said. "Russia is interested in enhancing its defense potential. ... Only partners trade arms."
He said Russia was very interested in cooperation with other countries on innovation, research and creating joint ventures. For example, he noted the country's interest in NATO projects such as Standex, or stand-off detection of suicide bombers.
He added that Russia will do all it can to have a modern military industrial complex and is also interested in cooperation with NATO partners in buying new types of armaments.
"In the 21st century, we believe that Russia should go back to fully fledged participation in Europe," he said.
Rogozin will be returning to Russia as vice prime minister in charge of defense industry policy. His tasks will include potential threats to Russia's security, including, the development of the country's navy.
Rogozin, who will be in charge of negotiations with the U.S. and NATO on the thorny issue of missile defense capacity, stressed that the system cannot contain "offensive elements" and must include a Russian role.
"If we believe the missile defense system is designed to give more security to Europe, then it can only be done with Russian participation" Rogozin said.
"If it is antagonistic to Russian interests ... this will lead to an exacerbation of relations with the West. It is up to our U.S. partners to come up with a system concentrated on deploying additional sites that does not infringe the interests of neighbors but engages neighbors in its work."

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Would the US be defeated in the Persian Gulf in a War with Iran?


mi

GIF - 81.5 kb
Soldiers attend Iranian massive naval maneuvers dubbed Velayat 90 on the Sea of Oman, Iran, Dec. 28, 2011. The naval drills cover an area of 2,000 km stretching from the east of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden.
(Xinhua/Stringer/Ali Mohammadi)
After years of U.S. threats, Iran has started to take very public steps to demonstrate that it is willing and capable of closing the Strait of Hormuz. On December 24, 2011 Iran started its Velayat-90 naval drills in and around the Strait of Hormuz and extending from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (Oman Sea) to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. Since these drills took place there has been a growing war of words between Washington and Tehran. Nothing the Obama Administration or the Pentagon had done or said deterred Tehran from continuing the naval drills.
The Geo-Political Nature of the Strait of Hormuz
Besides the fact that it is a vital transit point for global energy resources and a strategic chokepoint, two additional things should be noted in regards to the Strait of Hormuz’s relationship to Iran. The first point is about the geography of the Strait of Hormuz. The second point is about the role of Iran in co-managing the strategic strait on the basis of international law and its sovereign rights.
GIF - 69.2 kb
Source : http://www.marketoracle.co.uk
The maritime traffic that goes through the Strait of Hormuz has always been in contact with Iranian naval forces, which are predominately composed of the Iranian Regular Force Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy. In fact, Iranian naval forces monitor and police the Strait of Hormuz along with the Sultanate of Oman via the Omani enclave of Musandam. More importantly, to go through the Strait of Hormuz all maritime traffic, including the U.S. Navy, sails through Iranian territory. No country can enter the Persian Gulf and transit the Strait of Hormuz without sailing through Iranian waters and territory. Almost all entrances into the Persian Gulf are made through Iranian waters and most exits are through Omani waters.
Iran allows foreign ships to use its territorial waters in good faith and on the basis of Part III of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea’s maritime transit passage provisions that stipulate that vessels are free to sail through the Strait of Hormuz and similar bodies of water on the basis of speedy and continuous navigation between an open port and the high seas. Although Tehran in custom follows the navigation practices of the Law of the Sea, Tehran is not legally bound by them. Like Washington, Tehran signed this international treaty, but never ratified it.
American-Iranian Tensions in the Persian Gulf
Now the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) is re-evaluating the use of Iranian waters at the Strait of Hormuz. Legislation is being proposed by Iranian parliamentarians to block any foreign warships from being able to use Iranian territorial waters to navigate through the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian permission; the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is currently studying legislating this as an official Iranian posture on the basis of Iranian strategic interests and national security. [1]
On December 30, 2011, the U.S.S. John C. Stennispassed through the area where Iran was conducting its naval drills. The Commander of the Iranian Regular Forces, Major-General Ataollah Salehi, advised the U.S.S.John C. Stennis and other U.S. Navy vessels not to return to the Persian Gulf while Iran was doing its drills, saying that Iran is not in the habit of repeating a warning twice. [2] Shortly after the stern Iranian warning to Washington, the Pentagon’s press secretary responded by making a statement saying: “No one in this government seeks confrontation [with Iran] over the Strait of Hormuz. It’s important to lower the temperature.” [3]
In an actual scenario of military conflict with Iran it is very likely that U.S. aircraft carriers would actually operate from outside of the Persian Gulf and from the southern Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Unless the missile systems that Washington is erecting in the petro-sheikhdoms of the southern Persian Gulf are fully capable and active, the deployment of large U.S. warships may be unlikely in the Persian Gulf. The reasons for this are tied to geographic realities and the defensive capabilities of Iran.
Geography is against the Pentagon: U.S. Naval Strength has limits in the Persian Gulf
U.S. naval strength, which predominately includes the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, essentially has primacy over all the other navies and maritime forces in the world. Its deep sea or oceanic capabilities are unparalleled or unmatched by any other naval power. Nevertheless, primacy does not mean invincibility. U.S. naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are very vulnerable to Iran.
Despite its might and shear strength, geography literally works against U.S. naval power in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The relative narrowness of the Persian Gulf makes it like a channel, at least in a strategic and military context. Figuratively speaking, the aircraft carriers and warships of the U.S. are confined to narrow waters or are closed in within the coastal waters of the Persian Gulf.
This is where the Iranian military’s advanced missile capabilities come into play. The Iranian missile and torpedo arsenal would make short work of U.S. naval assets in the waters of the Persian Gulf where U.S. vessels are constricted. This is why the U.S. has been busily erecting a missile shield system in the Persian Gulf amongst the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the last few years.
Even the small Iranian patrol boats in the Persian Gulf, which appear pitiable and insignificant against a U.S. aircraft carrier or destroyer, threaten U.S. warships. Looks can be deceiving; these Iranian patrol boats can easily launch a barrage of missiles that could significantly damage and effectively sink large U.S. warships. Iranian small patrol boats are also hardly detectable and hard to target.
Iranian forces could also attack U.S. naval capabilities merely by launching missile attacks from the Iranian mainland on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf. Even in 2008 the Washington Institute for Near East Policy acknowledged the threat from Iran’s mobile coastal missile batteries, anti-ship missiles, and missile-armed small ships. [4] Other Iranian naval assets like aerial drones, hovercraft, mines, diver teams, and mini-submarines could also be used in asymmetrical naval warfare against the U.S. Fifth Fleet.
Even the Pentagon’s own war simulations have shown that a war in the Persian Gulf with Iran would spell disaster for the United States and its military. One key example is the Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) war game in the Persian Gulf, which was conducted from July 24, 2002 to August 15, 2002 and took almost two years to prepare. This mammoth drill was amongst the largest and most expensive war games ever held by the Pentagon. Millennium Challenge 2002 was held shortly after the Pentagon had decided that it would continue the momentum of the war in Afghanistan by targeting Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and finishing off with the big prize of Iran in a broad military campaign to ensure U.S. primacy in the new millennium.
After Millennium Challenge 2002 was finished, the war game was presented as a simulation of a war against Iraq under the rule of President Saddam Hussein, but this cannot be true. [5] The U.S. had already made assessments for the upcoming Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. Moreover, Iraq had no naval capabilities that would merit such large-scale use of the U.S. Navy.
Millennium Challenge 2002 was conducted to simulate a war with Iran, which was codenamed “Red” and referred to as an unknown Middle Eastern rogue enemy state in the Persian Gulf. Other than Iran, no other country could meet the perimeters and characteristics of “Red” and its military forces, from the patrol boats to the motorcycle units. The war simulation took place because Washington was planning on attacking Iran soon after invading Iraq in 2003.
The scenario in the 2002 war game started with the U.S., codenamed “Blue,” giving Iran a one-day ultimatum to surrender in the year 2007. The war game’s date of 2007 would chronologically correspond to U.S. plans to attack Iran after the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, which was suppose to expand into a broader war against Syria too. The war against Lebanon, however, did not go as planned and the U.S. and Israel realized that if Hezbollah could challenge them in Lebanon then an expanded war with Syria and Iran would be a disaster.
In Millennium Challenge 2002’s war scenario, Iran would react to U.S. aggression by launching a massive barrage of missiles that would overwhelm the U.S. and destroy sixteen U.S. naval vessels – an aircraft carrier, ten cruisers, and five amphibious ships. It is estimated that if this happened in reality, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemen would have been dead after the attack within a single day. [6] Next, Iran would send its small patrol boats – the ones that look insignificant in comparison to theU.S.S. John C. Stennis and other large U.S. warships – to overwhelm the remainder of the Pentagon’s naval forces in the Persian Gulf, which would result in the damaging and sinking of most of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the defeat of the United States. After the U.S. defeat, the war games were started over again, but “Red” had to operate under handicapping restraints so that U.S. forces would be allowed to emerge victorious from the drill. [7] This would hide the reality of the fact that the U.S. would be overwhelmed as an outcome of a conventional war with Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Hence, the formidable naval power of Washington is handicapped by geography coupled with Iranian military capabilities when it comes to fighting Tehran in the Persian Gulf or even in much of the Gulf of Oman. Without open waters, like in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. will have to fight under significantly reduced response times and, more importantly, will not be able to fight from a stand-off (militarily safe) distance. Thus, entire tool boxes of U.S. naval defensive systems, which were designed for combat in open waters using stand-off ranges, are rendered unpractical in the Persian Gulf.
Making the Strait of Hormuz Redundant to Weaken Iran?
The entire world knows the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington and its allies are very well aware that the Iranians can militarily close it for a significant period of time. This is why the U.S. has been working with the GCC countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the U.A.E. – to re-route their oil through pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and channelling GCC oil directly to the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, or Mediterranean Sea. Washington has also been pushing Iraq to seek alternative routes in talks with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Both Israel and Turkey have also been very interested in this strategic project. Ankara has had discussions with Qatar about setting up an oil terminal that would reach Turkey via Iraq. The Turkish government has attempted to get Iraq to link its southern oil fields, like Iraq’s northern oil fields, to the transit routes running through Turkey. This is all tied to Turkey’s visions of being an energy corridor and important lynchpin of transit.
The aims of re-routing oil away from the Persian Gulf would remove an important element of strategic leverage Iran has against Washington and its allies. It would effectively reduce the importance of the Strait of Hormuz. It could very well be a prerequisite to war preparations and a war led by the United States against Tehran and its allies.
It is within this framework that the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline or the Hashan-Fujairah Oil Pipeline is being fostered by the United Arab Emirates to bypass the maritime route in the Persian Gulf going through the Strait of Hormuz. The project design was put together in 2006, the contract was issued in 2007, and construction was started in 2008. [8] This pipeline goes straight from Abdu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah on the shore of the Arabian Sea. In other words it will give oil exports from the U.A.E. direct access to the Indian Ocean. It has openly been presented as a means to ensure energy security by bypassing Hormuz and attempting to avoid the Iranian military. Along with the construction of this pipeline, the erection of a strategic oil reservoir at Fujairah was also envisaged to also maintain the flow of oil to the international market should the Persian Gulf be closed off. [9]
Aside from the Petroline (East-West Saudi Pipeline), Saudi Arabia has also been looking at alternative transit routes and examining the ports of it southern neighbours in the Arabian Peninsula, Oman and Yemen. The Yemenite port of Mukalla on the shores of the Gulf of Aden has been of particular interest to Riyadh. In 2007, Israeli sources reported with some fanfare that a pipeline project was in the works that would connect the Saudi oil fields with Fujairah in the U.A.E., Muscat in Oman, and finally to Mukalla in Yemen. The reopening of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Pipeline (IPSA), which was ironically built by Saddam Hussein to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and Iran, has also been a subject of discussion for the Saudis with the Iraqi government in Baghdad.
If Syria and Lebanon were converted into Washington’s clients, then the defunct Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) could also be reactivated, along with other alternative routes going from the Arabian Peninsula to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea via the Levant. Chronologically, this would also fit into Washington’s efforts to overrun Lebanon and Syria in an attempt to isolate Iran before any possible showdown with Tehran.
The Iranian Velayat-90 naval drills, which extended in close proximity to the entrance of the Red Sea in the Gulf of Aden off the territorial waters of Yemen, also took place in the Gulf of Oman facing the coast of Oman and the eastern shores of the United Arab Emirates. Amongst other things, Velayat-90 should be understood as a signal that Tehran is ready to operate outside of the Persian Gulf and can even strike or block the pipelines trying to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
JPEG - 25.8 kb
The first Trans-Arabia pipeline designed to keep tankers out of Iran’s range.
Geography again is on Iran’s side in this case too. Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz still does not change the fact that most of the oil fields belonging to GCC countries are located in the Persian Gulf or near its shores, which means they are all situated within close proximity to Iran and therefore close Iranian striking distance. Like in the case of the Hashan-Fujairah Pipeline, the Iranians could easily disable the flow of oil from the point of origin. Tehran could launch missile and aerial attacks or deploy its ground, sea, air, and amphibious forces into these areas as well. It does not necessarily need to block the Strait of Hormuz; after all preventing the flow of energy is the main purpose of the Iranian threats.
The American-Iranian Cold War
Washington has been on the offensive against Iran using any means at its disposal. The tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf are just one front in a dangerous multi-front regional cold war between Tehran and Washington in the broader Middle East. Since 2001, the Pentagon has also been restructuring its military to wage unconventional wars with enemies like Iran. [10] Nonetheless, geography has always worked against the Pentagon and the U.S. has not found a solution for its naval dilemma in the Persian Gulf. Instead of a conventional war, Washington has had to resort to waging a covert, economic, and diplomatic war against Iran.

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

U.S. Drone Strikes Resume in Pakistan; 4 Killed


MIRANSHAH, Pakistan - The deadly U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan's tribal zone resumed with a missile strike that killed four militants, two months after a NATO raid that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.
The CIA campaign had reportedly been suspended to avoid worsening relations between the United States and Pakistan after the deadly Nov. 26 incident, which eroded even more the thin veneer of trust between the wary allies.
The four militants were killed late Jan. 10 when two missiles struck their compound on the outskirts of Miranshah in North Waziristan, a lawless tribal region near the Afghan border, security officials said.
The attack set the building on fire, and flames could be seen from the roofs of houses in Miranshah, which lies three miles away, residents reported.
It was the first missile strike in Pakistan since Nov. 17. It remains to be seen if it presages a new round of attacks on Taliban and al-Qaida-linked militants based in the remote territory bordering Afghanistan.
November's strike by NATO helicopters triggered outrage in Pakistan and aggravated tensions in an already shaky relationship with Washington. The incident prompted Islamabad to block alliance supply convoys heading to Afghanistan.
Islamabad also ordered the U.S. to last month leave Shamsi air base in western Pakistan, from where it is believed to have launched some of its drones. Others are thought to be fired from within Afghanistan.
A joint U.S.-NATO investigation concluded last month that a catalogue of errors and botched communications led to the soldiers' deaths. But Pakistan rejected the findings, insisting the strikes had been deliberate.
NATO's probe said that both sides failed to give the other information about their operational plans or the location of troops and that there was inadequate coordination by U.S. and Pakistani officers.
The U.S. drone campaign has reportedly killed dozens of al-Qaida operatives and hundreds of low-ranking fighters in Pakistan since the first Predator strike in 2004.
But the program has incensed many Pakistanis and fuels widespread anti-American sentiment throughout the country.
The Los Angeles Times reported last month that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had suspended drone strikes on gatherings of low-ranking militants in Pakistan due to the tensions caused by the campaign.
The latest drone strike came on the same day that a remote-controlled bomb killed 35 people and wounded more than 60 others in the troubled Khyber tribal region of northwest Pakistan.
The region had served as the main supply route for NATO forces operating in Afghanistan before the suspension triggered by the November incident.
There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the bombing but local residents suggested it was a tribal dispute.
The U.S. denounced the blast, which struck in a marketplace.
"By callously targeting innocent peoples, the extremists who planned and perpetrated this attack are just showing their contempt for the value of human life," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said.
"We remain deeply committed to working with Pakistan to address these kinds of terrorist threats and the results of violent extremism," she said.
Nuland added that Washington could not confirm reports that al-Qaida was behind the attack.
The border crossing for supplies to foreign troops fighting in Afghanistan remains closed. NATO said this month that it wants to get relations with Pakistan back on track "as quickly as possible" so it can be reopened.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

An AirSea Battle on the Potomac


It is clear from last month's commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor that this disaster continues to impact the U.S. psyche and national strategy. "The next Pearl Harbor" has been a common theme in reports regarding 9/11.
One can assume the recently developed and classified AirSea Battle Concept has a similar vista. Addressing the "anti-access/area denial" environment, it purportedly discusses the growing influence of China and the importance of Asia to America's national interests. As the name states, air and sea power will be critical to the attainment of U.S. national interests.
While analogies to Pearl Harbor are understandable, they may be misleading on the challenges of tomorrow. A more appropriate lesson might be found in the Battle of Midway.
As the sun rose on June 4, 1942, the Imperial Navy of Japan was the most powerful navy ever to sail. By sunset, its eventual defeat was inevitable. Japan in 1942 possessed six world-class aircraft carriers and the finest naval aviators. Four carriers were lost on that day.
Lacking a robust industrial base, Japan would produce only seven additional fleet carriers by the end of the war (the U.S. more than 20). Rational or not, Japan started a war with a limited force structure and little ability to replenish loses.
Fast-forward to 2012. In a world of iPads, it is incredible, but the forces that will carry out the AirSea Battle construct reflect decisions made decades ago. Tomorrow's U.S. Air Force will possess a nominal force of bombers and a handful of sophisticated F-22s and F-35s. While highly capable, these fifth-generation fighters lack the range and payload necessary for conflicts in Asia. Friendly bases are few.
The airfields close enough for effective sortie generation rates with fifth-gen fighters will likewise be within range of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. This environment requires hardened facilities and a robust missile-defense system. The former do not exist and the latter only in limited numbers.
While U.S. naval forces will benefit from their mobility, they too will face a Chinese anti-access threat projected to acquire and target surface combatants. With a deck of F/A-18s and F-35s, our carriers will be as range-challenged as our land-based fighters. Getting the carrier to the fight will require expensive escorts to defend against missile attacks. Combat operations would quickly become problematic once the defensive armaments are depleted.
Complicating this bleak outlook is the acquisition death spiral of increased cost/reduced numbers. As weapon systems progress through the acquisition cycle, they invariably fall behind schedule from unforeseen production issues. This drives up the cost, reducing the number of systems that can be purchased. The spiral continues with the war fighter receiving fewer platforms, later than needed, and costing significantly more than planned.
These two flaws could leave the U.S. in the same position that Japan found itself in 1943, weakened and unable to reconstitute a viable force. A small fighter force will generate few effective sorties (this assumes sufficient aerial tankers. Fighters in Asia are static displays without tankers). The loss of a Nimitz-class carrier would rival Pearl Harbor in loss of life and drive our surface naval forces out of harm's way. Like Imperial Japan, a Midway debacle would cripple U.S. power projection. And like Japan of 1943, America of 2012 cannot quickly reconstitute our current weapon systems.
With senior leaders stating there are no alternatives to weapon systems currently in development, it's apparent their predecessors organized a Pickett's Charge decades ago and left the charge to them. Resolving this mismatch between force structure and strategy will require a proper focus on the challenges of combat operations in the Pacific.
Specifically, in the short term:
■ Expand procurement of standoff missiles, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range.
■ Regain our superiority in electronic warfare that was lost in our infatuation with stealth.
■ Purchase low-end attack aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles for noncontested environments.
■ Limit the F-35 buy to 200 to 400 aircraft.
For the long term:
■ Develop manned/unmanned long-range penetrating precision strike platforms (both land- and carrier-based).
■ Research and develop 21st century battleships capable of firing ballistic and cruise missiles from long range.
On June 3, 1942, the Imperial Navy of Japan was the uncontested master of the Pacific. On the following day, American ingenuity, guts and a degree of luck made Japan's eventual defeat inevitable. The future naval and air forces of the U.S. could face a similar tragedy, one in which the finest air and naval forces are rendered incapable of effective combat operations due to a 20-year process where we purchased what we wanted instead of what we needed.
Perhaps the most important contribution from an honest assessment of the AirSea Battle construct will be to own up to this unfortunate fact.
Chris Choate is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel now performing operational test and evaluation work with the service as a civilian employee. These views reflect those of the author and not the Air Force, Defense Department or U.S. government.