Russia's Submarine Blunder: Kazan's Sonar Signature Compromised Near Cuba

 After the Russian Yasen-class submarine, Kazan, made an appearance in Cuba, initial excitement about its proximity to the US turned into regret among Russian experts. According to the Russian site Top War, this move is seen as a significant blunder, with Americans already mocking Russia. The site criticizes the decision, noting that sending the submarine into the American anti-submarine zone compromised its stealth advantage.

In Cuba, crowds gathered to see the Kazan up close, but this exposure meant the US and NATO could now detect the submarine more easily. The Atlantic is heavily monitored by American and NATO forces, using advanced detection systems in key areas like the Barents and Norwegian Seas, the Faroe-Icelandic Gap, and the Davis Strait. These systems, combined with sophisticated patrol aviation, make it nearly impossible for a Russian submarine to enter the Atlantic undetected.

Submarines are primarily detected through passive noise direction finding and active sonar methods. Passive systems pick up on low-frequency sounds, while active sonar involves sending out a signal that bounces off the submarine and returns to the receiver. Modern ships enhance detection capabilities with low-frequency emitters and towed sonar stations, making it hard for submarines to remain hidden.

However, detecting a submarine with another submarine is more complex, as Russian submarines have very low noise levels in stealth mode. Identifying an underwater target’s unique acoustic signature can help isolate it from background noise, crucial for long-distance detection.

Previously, the US lacked detailed acoustic data on the Kazan. But after its exposure near Cuba, advanced computer systems recorded its acoustic signature, allowing the US to identify and track it more efficiently. This shift in detection methods significantly disadvantages Russia in terms of submarine stealth capabilities.

The potential implications are severe. The US could launch a nuclear strike against Russia or China with minimal retaliation risk if they can neutralize Russian strategic submarines. This was demonstrated in June 2023, showing the importance of disabling Russia’s submarine fleet to prevent a retaliatory strike. Russian submarines often operate under the ice, complicating detection, but a detailed sonar signature would allow American submarines to locate and target them from a safe distance, even in challenging environments.

Why the U.S. Navy Avoided Building Titanium Submarines While Russia Embraced Them

 

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union ventured into using titanium for submarine hulls, beginning with the Project 705 Lira. Titanium's low density, high strength, and corrosion resistance allowed the Lira to achieve high speeds and deep dives. Despite these advantages, titanium posed significant challenges in sourcing and welding, making it a difficult material to work with.

The Cold War era saw rapid advancements in military technology, with both superpowers heavily investing in weapons development. This period of innovation extended to materials science, leading to the development of advanced materials like radar-absorbent coatings and sophisticated tank armor. The Soviet Union's use of titanium for submarine hulls was part of this trend.

Before the 1960s, titanium had never been used for submarine hulls due to its difficulty in sourcing and welding. Steel was the standard material, being easier to obtain and work with. However, titanium's properties—low density, high strength, and resistance to corrosion—were appealing for creating fast and durable submarines.

The Soviets began using titanium for their submarines with the Project 705 Lira. The Lira was designed to be fast, stealthy, and maneuverable, with minimal displacement and crew. Titanium was crucial in meeting these demanding specifications. The original Lira prototype, weighing just 1,500 tons, could achieve speeds over 40 knots, making it one of the fastest submarines of its time.

The Lira featured a titanium hull and a new lead-cooled reactor, allowing it to dive and turn quickly. However, the Soviets soon discovered the drawbacks of working with titanium. Welding titanium was complex, with a small margin for error; any mistake could make the material brittle and weak.

During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union often mirrored each other's innovations. If one superpower developed a new technology, the other would rush to create a counterpart. However, the U.S. Navy chose not to follow the Soviet Union's lead in building titanium submarines.

Despite recognizing the power, speed, and stealth of the Lira-class submarines, the U.S. Navy decided that the effort and cost of using titanium were not justified. Titanium is rare, costly, and difficult to shape. Mistakes in welding could compromise the submarine's safety during deep dives. Ultimately, the U.S. determined that the challenges outweighed the benefits, showcasing a rare instance of restraint in Cold War-era weapons development. 

While the Soviet Union embraced titanium for its submarine hulls, the U.S. Navy opted out due to the material's complexities and high costs. This decision highlights a strategic choice to prioritize practicality and safety over potential advantages, marking a notable moment of caution in the otherwise competitive landscape of Cold War military innovation.

Can Russia's Navy Achieve its Goal of 50 New Ships in 2024?

 

The Russian Navy is projected to receive around 50 ships of various classes this year, a significant increase from the 32 delivered last year, as stated by the deputy minister of industry and trade. This announcement comes amid ongoing military actions in Ukraine, where Ukrainian forces have damaged or destroyed several Russian naval vessels.

In a June 9 interview with state-owned Zvezda TV, Deputy Minister Viktor Yevtukhov shared this forecast. Over the past decade, the Ministry of Industry and Trade reports that the Navy has received 40 surface ships and 24 submarines.

In 2023, the Navy received three submarines: the Borei-A-class Emperor Alexander III, the Yasen-class Krasnoyarsk, and the Kilo-class Mozhaysk. Additionally, the Navy acquired seven surface ships: the frigate Admiral Golovko, corvettes Merkury and Rezkiy, missile ships Cyclone and Naro-Fominsk, the minesweeper Lev Chernavin, and the refurbished frigate Neustrashimy.

For this year, the Navy is expected to receive four submarines and 12 surface ships, along with a variety of support vessels such as tug boats, bulk carriers, training vessels, hydrographic vessels, rescue ships, supply vessels, and other small boats, according to Pavel Luzin from the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis.

Yevtukhov attributed the anticipated delivery surge to successful efforts in finding replacements for components blocked by international sanctions. Sergey Smyslov, an independent analyst with experience in Russia’s defense sector, noted that domestic organizations are now producing these substitute components. While these replacements may not be of the highest quality and require additional development time, they meet the minimum necessary requirements.

However, Luzin pointed out that using outdated or low-quality technology affects the reliability of the final products. Despite this, a source in Russia’s naval industry mentioned that the Defence Ministry is generally satisfied with submarine construction but highlighted persistent issues with surface ship production, including frequent delivery delays.

Emma Rayman, a politician from St. Petersburg, cited financial constraints as a major problem affecting the speed and scale of naval construction. For instance, the Severnaya Verf shipyard's transfer of the frigate Admiral Isakov, originally scheduled for 2022, is now delayed to December 2025. Similarly, the corvette Provorny, initially expected by the end of 2022, is now slated for 2025 due to fire damage. Two Steregushchiy-class corvettes expected in 2018 saw only one delivered in 2023.

Other shipyards have also faced setbacks. Admiralty Shipyards, expected to deliver a patrol ship in 2020, now plans to complete it this year. Yantar Shipyard’s delivery of the large landing ships Vladimir Andreev and Vasily Trushin, initially set for 2023-2024, has been postponed to 2025-2026. Vostochnaya Shipyard’s construction of two Karakurt-class corvettes and a small tanker has been taken over by Amur Shipbuilding Plant due to financial issues.

Rayman and Luzin both noted a shortage of engineers and specialists in the domestic shipbuilding industry, further hindering construction efforts and leaving a lack of personnel to crew the ships.

Pakistan's Potential Nuclear Submarine Program Challenges Indian Naval Strategy

 Pakistan is considering enhancing its naval capabilities by equipping its under-construction Chinese submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles, potentially altering the strategic balance for the Indian Navy.

Delays due to fiscal constraints had postponed the acquisition of S-26 Hangor class submarines from China. Initially expected by the end of 2023, the first of these Yuan-class submarines was launched in May 2024.

Once eight of these submarines, equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP), join the Pakistan Navy, they will significantly boost the country’s offensive sea denial strategy, which emphasizes the use of submarines and missile-carrying maritime patrol aircraft. Expected to be operational by the late 2020s and early 2030s, the addition will increase the number of AIP-equipped submarines in the Pakistan Navy to 11.

Recent reports suggest that the Hangor class may not be a purely conventional attack submarine. Retired Pakistani naval officers have discussed on state television that Islamabad is aiming for an “assured” second-strike capability.

According to a Quwa report, Vice Admiral Ahmed Saeed and Rear Admiral Saleem Akhtar, both retired officials, talked about acquiring Hangor-class submarines from China. Saeed suggested these submarines would be a "hybrid," balancing conventional attack capabilities with nuclear potential.

While retrofitting the Hangor class with nuclear reactors is unlikely, Pakistan could deploy Tactical Nuclear Warheads (TNWs) on these submarines. Building nuclear-powered submarines is costly and complex, as noted by retired Commodore Anil Jai Singh, making it improbable even with Chinese assistance.

Pakistan has been developing TNWs since its first nuclear test in 1998. These smaller, portable weapons are designed for battlefield use rather than as strategic deterrents. The Hangor-class submarines will likely use a variant of the Babur-3 Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), first tested in 2018 with a range of 450 km. The Babur-3 is a critical component of Pakistan’s “credible second-strike capability,” according to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR).

Vice Admiral Saeed emphasized that while the Hangor class is not a dedicated nuclear platform, the Pakistan Navy seeks to fire nuclear weapons from the sea, potentially requiring just one or two dedicated submarines. However, the Hangor class would primarily manage conventional roles and only strategic duties part-time.

Commodore Singh expressed doubts about the effectiveness of a single nuclear-armed submarine in the Pakistan Navy. He suggested that China might lease one to Pakistan in the future, but this remains uncertain.

Indian Navy's Concerns

While Pakistan cannot independently design and develop a nuclear-powered submarine, it may be exploring the possibility as part of a long-term strategy. China's support in arming Pakistan with such a submarine would challenge the Indian Navy’s dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has already been supplying submarines to Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Myanmar, creating a competitive underwater environment in the IOR.

Retired Captain Anurag Bisen highlighted that a Pakistani submarine armed with TNWs would constrain the Indian Navy's deployment of its aircraft carriers until the submarine is accounted for.

India has been adopting a flexible deterrence approach against China and Pakistan. In March, New Delhi successfully tested the long-range ballistic missile Agni-V, featuring Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, enhancing the survivability of its nuclear missiles.

Despite the potential threat from TNWs, Commodore Singh remains optimistic, questioning whether Pakistan has considered India's likely retaliation, as stated in its nuclear doctrine. Using TNWs is complicated and risky, making their actual deployment a significant gamble for Pakistan.

US Navy Enhances Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence Amid China Tensions

 

The United States is boosting its nuclear deterrence by developing sea-based nuclear cruise missiles to counter threats from China and Russia. This initiative comes as tensions with these adversaries escalate.

Currently, the U.S. nuclear triad includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-based weapons. However, the Pentagon is now focusing on enhancing its sea-based nuclear capabilities to ensure a reliable second-strike option, crucial if land-based and air-launched systems are compromised in a first strike.

Navy Vice Adm. Johnny R. Wolfe Jr., Director for Strategic Systems, testified before the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, emphasizing the deterrent role of ballistic missile submarines, which remain on alert and undetectable. This capability ensures the U.S. can retaliate effectively if attacked.

Alongside Air Force Gen. Thomas A. Bussiere, Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, Vice Adm. Wolfe detailed the modernization efforts of the Navy's nuclear triad, highlighting the new sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). This missile is designed to be launched from attack submarines and surface vessels, rather than just ballistic missile submarines.

Wolfe pointed out the challenges of reviving the industrial base needed for SLCM-N production and the significant investments required for concurrent nuclear modernization programs. The SLCM-N aims to counter the expanding nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, with Russia possessing nearly a thousand tactical nuclear weapons and China having around 500 nuclear warheads.

A previous Pentagon report noted that China's Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, equipped with JL-3 missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, are conducting near-continuous patrols in the South China Sea, posing a significant threat to U.S. security.

The introduction of the SLCM-N marks the first new U.S. nuclear weapon since the end of the Cold War, signaling to adversaries that the U.S. remains capable of responding to any nuclear threat. This development is essential for maintaining strategic stability and deterring potential nuclear attacks.

Vice Adm. Wolfe stressed the need for investments in infrastructure, human capital, and the industrial base to achieve nuclear modernization. He highlighted the necessity of balancing the SLCM-N program with ongoing Navy initiatives and the importance of continued support from Congress to deliver a reliable sea-based strategic deterrent capability.

As the U.S. transitions from Ohio-class to Columbia-class submarines, maintaining the current missile inventory and ensuring a seamless transition between the classes are critical priorities.

Sen. Deb Fischer emphasized the need for diverse deterrence options, and Wolfe concurred, noting that nuclear modernization requires careful planning and time to balance various operational needs and strategic goals.

US Navy Ship Programs Grapple with Years-Long Delays Amid Workforce and Supply Challenges

 In a significant setback for the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding programs, several key projects are facing delays ranging from one to three years due to a myriad of workforce and management issues within the industry.

Following a 45-day review prompted by delays in the guided-missile frigate program, the Navy discovered significant setbacks in its shipbuilding portfolio. The delays affect critical projects such as the Virginia-class attack submarine construction and the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, prompting Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro to order an assessment of the underlying causes and potential solutions.

Key findings from the review revealed that the first Columbia-class SSBN is projected to deliver 12 to 16 months later than its contractual date, raising concerns about meeting deployment requirements. The Virginia-class submarines are also facing substantial delays, with the Block IV boats running 36 months behind schedule.

Supply chain disruptions and workforce shortages, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, have further complicated matters. The future Enterprise aircraft carrier, CVN-80, is expected to deliver 18 to 26 months late, primarily due to delays from key suppliers.

Additionally, the first Constellation frigate is facing a 36-month delay, attributed to management challenges and workforce issues at Fincantieri’s Marinette Marine shipyard.

The review highlighted the need for strategic investments in the workforce and supply chain as national assets. It also emphasized the importance of reevaluating risk-sharing arrangements between the government and shipbuilders in future contracts.

Addressing these challenges will require a concerted effort to strengthen workforce capabilities, enhance oversight in the design process, and ensure timely procurement of materials. Failure to address these issues could further prolong delays and jeopardize the Navy's readiness and operational capabilities.