Now that the dust has settled from Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent visit to Washington, we should pay attention to an Obama administration policy statement that could pose risks to U.S. national security. Two Cabinet secretaries have said the U.S. should be willing to sell advanced technology to China if the Chinese make sufficient economic concessions.
In a major speech on U.S.-China relations, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Jan. 12 that "China wants more access to U.S. high-technology products" and that "[w]e are willing to make progress on these issues, but our ability to move ... will depend, of course, on how much progress we see from China."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave her own speech a couple of days later, where she echoed Geithner by saying that "on the economic front," the U.S. will let China buy more U.S. technology if China stops discriminating against American companies.
This link was reinforced when Hu met with House lawmakers. Rep. Charles Boustany, R-La., said, "If they want us to relax export controls, then they need to take vigorous steps on the protection of intellectual property."
That may sound like a routine diplomatic trade-off, but what is the nature of those controls on high-technology exports that Geithner and Clinton said they would loosen? Generally, they are controls that the State and Commerce departments maintain on the export of U.S. technology that could assist China's military development.
For instance, the Commerce Department closely restricts the export to China of certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment, since advanced semiconductors are a key element of weapons. Controlled dual-use technology is often appropriately licensed to China for commercial customers, but only after careful interagency review based on national security policy.
The Geithner and Clinton statements appeared to disregard the continued national security rationale for these controls, even though the administration has recently emphasized the risks posed by the lack of transparency in China's military.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said just the week before that he finds China's military spending "worrisome."
There have been no announced changes to U.S. controls on exports to China since the Obama-Hu summit. Moreover, China is not included in the export reform proposal the administration published last December.
However, the leaders announced that "China welcomed discussion between the two sides on the ongoing reform of the U.S. export control system and its potential implications for U.S. exports to its major trading partners, including China, consistent with U.S. national security interests."
Does this mean that the administration might follow through later on the Geithner/Clinton position of using export controls as a bargaining chip? President Barack Obama has signaled the same willingness to reduce U.S. national security controls for the sake of increased exports in other contexts.
In his 2010 State of the Union speech, the president said he would revise U.S. export controls to increase exports. Similarly, in his National Export Initiative speech last March, Obama emphasized that reforming controls would promote U.S. exports.
These comments were of concern at the time because the administration has embarked on a major initiative - managed out of the White House - to fundamentally reform our export control system. There is bipartisan support for updating these rules to focus them on the national security goals of the 21st century. The Bush administration worked hard on this, seeking to focus controls on end-users that posed particular concerns and streamlining exports to close allies such as Australia and the United Kingdom.
As Gates has argued, in some ways the current system undermines our national security objectives. For instance, the rules delay the execution of major international projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter and drive up their cost.
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft led a major study at the National Academies that recommended significant reforms based on U.S. national security interests. Even with regard to China, there are probably certain U.S. restrictions that have become ineffective from a national security standpoint as a result of advances in technology made by the Chinese or other suppliers.
Yet Geithner and Clinton are wrong to link U.S. export control reform to market access. The policy must be based on national security interests, not economic factors. This error is especially worrisome in the context of China.
Further, the administration will jeopardize allied support for maintaining export controls, as well as domestic support for its hard work on export control reform, if it sacrifices national security controls for economic objectives.
Until now, a bipartisan consensus has ensured that the U.S. guards against exports to potential adversaries that would impair our military advantage. Obama should be careful to ensure that as his administration promotes exports to China and around the world, it does not thoughtlessly trade away these important controls for short-term economic gains.
Peter Lichtenbaum is former assistant secretary of commerce for export administration in the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush.
In a major speech on U.S.-China relations, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Jan. 12 that "China wants more access to U.S. high-technology products" and that "[w]e are willing to make progress on these issues, but our ability to move ... will depend, of course, on how much progress we see from China."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave her own speech a couple of days later, where she echoed Geithner by saying that "on the economic front," the U.S. will let China buy more U.S. technology if China stops discriminating against American companies.
This link was reinforced when Hu met with House lawmakers. Rep. Charles Boustany, R-La., said, "If they want us to relax export controls, then they need to take vigorous steps on the protection of intellectual property."
That may sound like a routine diplomatic trade-off, but what is the nature of those controls on high-technology exports that Geithner and Clinton said they would loosen? Generally, they are controls that the State and Commerce departments maintain on the export of U.S. technology that could assist China's military development.
For instance, the Commerce Department closely restricts the export to China of certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment, since advanced semiconductors are a key element of weapons. Controlled dual-use technology is often appropriately licensed to China for commercial customers, but only after careful interagency review based on national security policy.
The Geithner and Clinton statements appeared to disregard the continued national security rationale for these controls, even though the administration has recently emphasized the risks posed by the lack of transparency in China's military.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said just the week before that he finds China's military spending "worrisome."
There have been no announced changes to U.S. controls on exports to China since the Obama-Hu summit. Moreover, China is not included in the export reform proposal the administration published last December.
However, the leaders announced that "China welcomed discussion between the two sides on the ongoing reform of the U.S. export control system and its potential implications for U.S. exports to its major trading partners, including China, consistent with U.S. national security interests."
Does this mean that the administration might follow through later on the Geithner/Clinton position of using export controls as a bargaining chip? President Barack Obama has signaled the same willingness to reduce U.S. national security controls for the sake of increased exports in other contexts.
In his 2010 State of the Union speech, the president said he would revise U.S. export controls to increase exports. Similarly, in his National Export Initiative speech last March, Obama emphasized that reforming controls would promote U.S. exports.
These comments were of concern at the time because the administration has embarked on a major initiative - managed out of the White House - to fundamentally reform our export control system. There is bipartisan support for updating these rules to focus them on the national security goals of the 21st century. The Bush administration worked hard on this, seeking to focus controls on end-users that posed particular concerns and streamlining exports to close allies such as Australia and the United Kingdom.
As Gates has argued, in some ways the current system undermines our national security objectives. For instance, the rules delay the execution of major international projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter and drive up their cost.
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft led a major study at the National Academies that recommended significant reforms based on U.S. national security interests. Even with regard to China, there are probably certain U.S. restrictions that have become ineffective from a national security standpoint as a result of advances in technology made by the Chinese or other suppliers.
Yet Geithner and Clinton are wrong to link U.S. export control reform to market access. The policy must be based on national security interests, not economic factors. This error is especially worrisome in the context of China.
Further, the administration will jeopardize allied support for maintaining export controls, as well as domestic support for its hard work on export control reform, if it sacrifices national security controls for economic objectives.
Until now, a bipartisan consensus has ensured that the U.S. guards against exports to potential adversaries that would impair our military advantage. Obama should be careful to ensure that as his administration promotes exports to China and around the world, it does not thoughtlessly trade away these important controls for short-term economic gains.
Peter Lichtenbaum is former assistant secretary of commerce for export administration in the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush.