North Korea: U.S. Offered Food for Nuke Shutdown

SEOUL, South Korea - North Korea said Jan. 11 that the United States had offered food aid and a suspension of sanctions if it halted its uranium enrichment program.

The comments by a foreign ministry spokesman to Pyongyang's official news agency were the first by the North on the issue.

Before the sudden death of the North's leader Kim Jong-Il on Dec. 17, there were several media reports that such an agreement was imminent.

At talks in July last year, Washington "proposed to take confidence-building steps such as suspension of sanctions, as well as food aid" in return for a "temporary suspension" of uranium enrichment, the North's spokesman said.

Experts say the uranium program disclosed in November 2010 could give the communist state a second way to make nuclear weapons. The disclosure spurred efforts to revive stalled six-party nuclear disarmament negotiations.

The U.S. and North Korea last year held two rounds of bilateral talks aimed at restarting the negotiations last held in December 2008.

A third round was reportedly scheduled in Beijing before the announcement of Kim's death put the process on hold.

The spokesman's statement suggested that a deal was still on the cards if the U.S. raised the amount of food it is willing to offer. "We will watch if the U.S. truly wants to build confidence," it said.

Washington says any decision to offer humanitarian food aid would not be linked to other issues, but the spokesman accused the United States of politicizing the issue.

Robert King, U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, met senior North Korean foreign ministry official Ri Gun in Beijing in December to discuss a possible resumption of U.S. food aid.

South Korean media reports at the time said the North had agreed to suspend its uranium program while the U.S. would provide up to 240,000 tons of food.

The U.S. pledged 500,000 tons of rice in 2008. Shipments stopped the following year amid questions over transparency of the distribution, and Pyongyang told the Americans to leave.

The North's spokesman said Jan. 11 the U.S. had failed to provide 330,000 tons of the amount promised three years ago.

In recent talks it "has drastically changed the amount and items of provision contrary to the originally promised food aid", the spokesman said, adding this raised doubts about Washington's willingness to build confidence.

The U.S. is offering high-energy biscuits and similar nutritional supplements in its latest package, rather than rice which could be diverted to the military or the elite.

UN agencies that visited in February 2011 said six million North Koreans - a quarter of the population - need urgent aid in a nation where hundreds of thousands died in a famine in the 1990s.

U.S. Drone Strikes Resume in Pakistan; 4 Killed

MIRANSHAH, Pakistan - The deadly U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan's tribal zone resumed with a missile strike that killed four militants, two months after a NATO raid that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

The CIA campaign had reportedly been suspended to avoid worsening relations between the United States and Pakistan after the deadly Nov. 26 incident, which eroded even more the thin veneer of trust between the wary allies.

The four militants were killed late Jan. 10 when two missiles struck their compound on the outskirts of Miranshah in North Waziristan, a lawless tribal region near the Afghan border, security officials said.

The attack set the building on fire, and flames could be seen from the roofs of houses in Miranshah, which lies three miles away, residents reported.

It was the first missile strike in Pakistan since Nov. 17. It remains to be seen if it presages a new round of attacks on Taliban and al-Qaida-linked militants based in the remote territory bordering Afghanistan.

November's strike by NATO helicopters triggered outrage in Pakistan and aggravated tensions in an already shaky relationship with Washington. The incident prompted Islamabad to block alliance supply convoys heading to Afghanistan.

Islamabad also ordered the U.S. to last month leave Shamsi air base in western Pakistan, from where it is believed to have launched some of its drones. Others are thought to be fired from within Afghanistan.

A joint U.S.-NATO investigation concluded last month that a catalogue of errors and botched communications led to the soldiers' deaths. But Pakistan rejected the findings, insisting the strikes had been deliberate.

NATO's probe said that both sides failed to give the other information about their operational plans or the location of troops and that there was inadequate coordination by U.S. and Pakistani officers.

The U.S. drone campaign has reportedly killed dozens of al-Qaida operatives and hundreds of low-ranking fighters in Pakistan since the first Predator strike in 2004.

But the program has incensed many Pakistanis and fuels widespread anti-American sentiment throughout the country.

The Los Angeles Times reported last month that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had suspended drone strikes on gatherings of low-ranking militants in Pakistan due to the tensions caused by the campaign.

The latest drone strike came on the same day that a remote-controlled bomb killed 35 people and wounded more than 60 others in the troubled Khyber tribal region of northwest Pakistan.

The region had served as the main supply route for NATO forces operating in Afghanistan before the suspension triggered by the November incident.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the bombing but local residents suggested it was a tribal dispute.

The U.S. denounced the blast, which struck in a marketplace.

"By callously targeting innocent peoples, the extremists who planned and perpetrated this attack are just showing their contempt for the value of human life," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said.

"We remain deeply committed to working with Pakistan to address these kinds of terrorist threats and the results of violent extremism," she said.

Nuland added that Washington could not confirm reports that al-Qaida was behind the attack.

The border crossing for supplies to foreign troops fighting in Afghanistan remains closed. NATO said this month that it wants to get relations with Pakistan back on track "as quickly as possible" so it can be reopened.

An AirSea Battle on the Potomac

It is clear from last month's commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor that this disaster continues to impact the U.S. psyche and national strategy. "The next Pearl Harbor" has been a common theme in reports regarding 9/11.

One can assume the recently developed and classified AirSea Battle Concept has a similar vista. Addressing the "anti-access/area denial" environment, it purportedly discusses the growing influence of China and the importance of Asia to America's national interests. As the name states, air and sea power will be critical to the attainment of U.S. national interests.

While analogies to Pearl Harbor are understandable, they may be misleading on the challenges of tomorrow. A more appropriate lesson might be found in the Battle of Midway.

As the sun rose on June 4, 1942, the Imperial Navy of Japan was the most powerful navy ever to sail. By sunset, its eventual defeat was inevitable. Japan in 1942 possessed six world-class aircraft carriers and the finest naval aviators. Four carriers were lost on that day.

Lacking a robust industrial base, Japan would produce only seven additional fleet carriers by the end of the war (the U.S. more than 20). Rational or not, Japan started a war with a limited force structure and little ability to replenish loses.

Fast-forward to 2012. In a world of iPads, it is incredible, but the forces that will carry out the AirSea Battle construct reflect decisions made decades ago. Tomorrow's U.S. Air Force will possess a nominal force of bombers and a handful of sophisticated F-22s and F-35s. While highly capable, these fifth-generation fighters lack the range and payload necessary for conflicts in Asia. Friendly bases are few.

The airfields close enough for effective sortie generation rates with fifth-gen fighters will likewise be within range of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. This environment requires hardened facilities and a robust missile-defense system. The former do not exist and the latter only in limited numbers.

While U.S. naval forces will benefit from their mobility, they too will face a Chinese anti-access threat projected to acquire and target surface combatants. With a deck of F/A-18s and F-35s, our carriers will be as range-challenged as our land-based fighters. Getting the carrier to the fight will require expensive escorts to defend against missile attacks. Combat operations would quickly become problematic once the defensive armaments are depleted.

Complicating this bleak outlook is the acquisition death spiral of increased cost/reduced numbers. As weapon systems progress through the acquisition cycle, they invariably fall behind schedule from unforeseen production issues. This drives up the cost, reducing the number of systems that can be purchased. The spiral continues with the war fighter receiving fewer platforms, later than needed, and costing significantly more than planned.

These two flaws could leave the U.S. in the same position that Japan found itself in 1943, weakened and unable to reconstitute a viable force. A small fighter force will generate few effective sorties (this assumes sufficient aerial tankers. Fighters in Asia are static displays without tankers). The loss of a Nimitz-class carrier would rival Pearl Harbor in loss of life and drive our surface naval forces out of harm's way. Like Imperial Japan, a Midway debacle would cripple U.S. power projection. And like Japan of 1943, America of 2012 cannot quickly reconstitute our current weapon systems.

With senior leaders stating there are no alternatives to weapon systems currently in development, it's apparent their predecessors organized a Pickett's Charge decades ago and left the charge to them. Resolving this mismatch between force structure and strategy will require a proper focus on the challenges of combat operations in the Pacific.

Specifically, in the short term:

■ Expand procurement of standoff missiles, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range.

■ Regain our superiority in electronic warfare that was lost in our infatuation with stealth.

■ Purchase low-end attack aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles for noncontested environments.

■ Limit the F-35 buy to 200 to 400 aircraft.

For the long term:

■ Develop manned/unmanned long-range penetrating precision strike platforms (both land- and carrier-based).

■ Research and develop 21st century battleships capable of firing ballistic and cruise missiles from long range.

On June 3, 1942, the Imperial Navy of Japan was the uncontested master of the Pacific. On the following day, American ingenuity, guts and a degree of luck made Japan's eventual defeat inevitable. The future naval and air forces of the U.S. could face a similar tragedy, one in which the finest air and naval forces are rendered incapable of effective combat operations due to a 20-year process where we purchased what we wanted instead of what we needed.

Perhaps the most important contribution from an honest assessment of the AirSea Battle construct will be to own up to this unfortunate fact.

Chris Choate is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel now performing operational test and evaluation work with the service as a civilian employee. These views reflect those of the author and not the Air Force, Defense Department or U.S. government.

Cold War Treaty Puts U.S. in Corner Over China

The Cold War's most successful arms control agreement is imperiling U.S. forces and increasing the probability of a conflict in Asia.

The U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty contributed to stability in Europe during the Cold War's final years by eliminating both nuclear and conventionally armed ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

Now, however, the treaty is preventing the U.S. and Russia from responding to a growing threat from China, which has been expanding its missile force at an unparalleled rate. China now has at least hundreds of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. By comparison, Russia and the U.S. have none.

The last time Americans worried about a "missile gap" - a phrase consigned to history along with the Soviet Union - Gerald Ford was U.S. president, Berlin was a divided city and Taiwan was a U.S. treaty ally. With the Cold War's end and the emergence of a unipolar era, Americans, it was supposed, no longer needed to worry about comparing numbers of tanks, bombers and missiles.

But while Washington and Moscow were busy eliminating entire classes of missiles and with good reason, on the other side of the Eurasian land mass Beijing was investing in missile technology. Today, missiles play a central role in Chinese military strategy. And so, 20 years after the Soviet Union's dissolution, the U.S. is once again facing a missile gap, and unlike the missile gaps of the Cold War, there is no question as to this one's existence.

Why does this matter? The U.S.-China missile gap (and the Sino-Russian one, as well) creates strategic instability in a way that the perceived Cold War missile gaps never did. With its ground-based missiles, China can target U.S. and allied bases in the Asia-Pacific as far away as Guam, including key U.S. facilities in South Korea and Japan.

With its new anti-ship ballistic missile, also ground-launched, the People's Liberation Army will likewise be able to attack U.S. aircraft carriers and other capital ships at sea.

Because the U.S. cannot field intermediate-range missiles, it could not respond in kind to a missile strike on regional assets. Instead, it would have two options. It could rely on tactical fighters to carry out retaliatory strikes. Or, it could rely on longer-range options such as bombers or prompt global strike munitions (basically, conventionally armed intercontinental-range missiles).

Given Russia's lack of intermediate-range missiles, it would have similar options in responding to a Chinese missile attack.

The first option is highly escalatory because it involves an infringement of Chinese territorial integrity by a presumably large fighter force. It puts a higher number of American lives at risk and would engage a wider array of Chinese forces than a simpler tit-for-tat retaliatory missile strike. And reliance on tactical aircraft to respond to Chinese missile strikes could be problematic because those strikes might well have rendered U.S. airbases and aircraft carriers unusable, or worse.

Option two is potentially even more escalatory. Bombers and long-range missiles, after all, look an awful lot like nuclear delivery vehicles. China might very well be incapable of determining with what an incoming bomber or missile was armed. It is an open question whether Beijing would wait to find out before deciding how to respond.

Fortunately, the solution to this conundrum is quite clear. First, Washington and Moscow should invite Beijing (as well as other Asian states) to accede to the INF Treaty, or some updated version of it. If the Chinese decline the invitation, Russia and the U.S. should agree to abrogate the treaty while also agreeing to keep Europe free of those weapons, where a missile buildup would needlessly destabilize a largely stable region.

The U.S. military, and the Russian military if it desires, should then begin a spirited buildup of its own ground-based intermediate-range missile force in Asia.

Although counterintuitive, this would contribute to strategic stability. By developing more options for proportional responses to a Chinese military strike, the U.S. military would make escalation management an easier task, thus making vertical escalation much less likely. Such a move would also give Beijing incentive to sign up to a new INF treaty, as the value of its own missiles would be greatly diminished by a balanced U.S. missile force.

If other Asian states begin fielding theater-range ballistic missiles in large numbers as well - a likely scenario given their affordability and obvious merits - the need for a regionwide INF treaty would become apparent even to the Chinese.

But unless and until the U.S. narrows its missile gap with China, stability in Asia will continue to erode.

Michael Mazza is senior research associate, Foreign & Defense Policy Studies, at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

DoD OKs Army's $5.7B Aircraft Survivability Effort

The Pentagon has signed off on the U.S. Army's plan to spend $5.7 billion on anti-missile defenses for helicopters.

THE PENTAGON HAS signed off on a $5.7 billion anti-missile defense plan for helicopters like this CH-47. (Sgt. Dennis W. Jackson / U.S. Army)

In a Dec. 28 memo, acting Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall gave the service permission to begin the technology development phase for the Common Infrared Countermeasure (CIRCM) program.

Infrared countermeasures are used to confuse incoming missiles' guidance systems and thereby protect aircraft from being hit.

Attached to Kendall's memo was a cost chart for the CIRCM program produced by the Defense Department's Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE) office, a group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that provides independent cost estimates and advice for DoD decision-makers.

According to the chart, the total acquisition cost for the program is $5.7 billion. That includes $815 million for research and development, $3.3 billion for procurement and $1.6 billion in operation and support costs.

Kendall says the Army is to keep funding for the program under $225 million per year. Procurement of the systems does not begin to ramp up until 2017, according to the CAPE chart.

CAPE has estimated an average unit procurement cost for the system of $2.5 million.

Kendall's memo indicates that he has also approved the criteria that will be used to determine whether the program has successfully completed its development phase.

There are several companies competing for the technology development part of the program, including Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, ITT, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

CIRCM is intended as an improved, lighter-weight version of Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM), which was canceled and restructured after the Pentagon and Army officials determined the ATIRCM system to be too heavy for any helicopter other than the CH-47 Chinook.

After this discovery, the Pentagon and Army decided to reduce the ATIRCM buy, causing a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute, which requires the Pentagon to notify Congress when major defense programs experience substantial cost growth.

The Army declared a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach for ATIRCM in March 2010.

However, the Army was given permission to buy 83 ATIRCM systems to respond to an urgent request for CH-47s flying in Afghanistan.

Greece, Israel Pledge to Boost Defense Ties

ATHENS - Greece and Israel pledged to boost defense cooperation with a view to improving regional stability, their defense ministers told reporters Jan. 10.

GREEK DEFENCE MINISTER Dimitris Avramopoulos, right, and his Israeli counterpart Ehud Barak review a military honour guard during a welcoming ceremony in Athens on Jan. 10. (Aris Messinis / AFP)

"We are committed to work together to deepen our relations in defense and security," said Israel's Ehud Barak. "We have to be prepared for many kinds of developments. ... We must think ahead of time and work together."

Traditionally pro-Arab Greece, which did not officially recognize Israel until 1991, has stepped up efforts to attract investment and expertise to shore up its debt-struck economy.

The two countries are trying to "make up for lost time", Greek Defence Minister Dimitris Avramopoulos said, asserting Greece's "commitment to deepening the alliance with Israel ... in the name of friendship, peace and stability for all the peoples of the region".

Barak's two-day visit is the fourth by a senior Israeli official in 17 months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited in August 2010, followed by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in January 2011 and Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon in November, when Israel hosted a joint exercise with the Greek air force.

He said their cooperation was "honest and sincere (and) not directed against anyone", in a reference to Turkey, formerly a staunch ally of Israel but now on deteriorating terms with the Jewish state.

"To the contrary, this cooperation can create new sources of wealth for the entire region," Avramopoulos said at a time when Greece, lumbered with a severe debt crisis, hopes for economic benefits from closer ties with Israel.

Athens is keenly interested in Israel's economic rapprochement with traditional Greek ally Cyprus to develop undersea gas deposits in the eastern Mediterranean.

Pro-Palestinian Greek activists meanwhile have denounced Barak's visit, with a rights group calling him a "war criminal", and were set to stage a protest in central Athens later in the day.

Last July, Greece banned a flotilla of ships headed for Gaza from leaving its ports on a mission to break the Israeli blockade of the Palestinian territory.

An Israeli raid last year on another Gaza-bound aid flotilla left nine pro-Palestinian activists dead, all of them Turks or of Turkish origin, and precipitated a diplomatic crisis with Greece's regional rival Turkey.

S. Africa, Cuba Formalize Defense Cooperation

JOHANNESBURG - South Africa and Cuba signed a memorandum Jan. 10 to put a stamp on the cooperation between the two country's armies, a spokesman said.

Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu signed the memorandum of understanding with Ulises Rosales del Toro, the vice-president of Cuba's council of ministers, according to defense ministry spokesman Siphiwe Dlamini.

"We're cementing that South Africa-Cuban defense cooperation," Dlamini told AFP.

The two countries have already worked together in the past, but the agreement formalizes exchanges in the air force, veterans, military health and education, training and development.

"They're bringing their instructors. The main target is military health," said Dlamini. "The memorandum gives a framework on operations, but the details are left to the officials."

"We are looking to introduce Cuba to our defense industry," he said, adding that South Africa could also share its experiences in peace-keeping with Cuba.

The island state supported South Africa's ruling African National Congress during its struggle against apartheid. It opposed the apartheid regime and sent some 50,000 troops to Angola who fought South African apartheid forces until their withdrawal in the late 1980s.

The two countries established diplomatic relations at the fall of white-minority rule in 1994. They set up a joint bilateral commission in February 2001 and have since cooperated in a number of projects including sending South African medical students to study in Cuba. Cuban doctors and teachers have also come to work in South Africa.

A 2004-agreement between South Africa and Cuba resulted in the deployment of 101 Cuban doctors to Mali, with financial backing from South Africa. In 2008 South Africa forgave Cuba's debt of 926.8-million-rand ($117million, 73 million euro).