Taiwan's Deputy Defense Minister 
Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) continues to maintain a  strong deterrence in the face of a growing Chinese military threat. The  island state's future is uncertain as the U.S. and China grow closer and  Washington wavers on the sale of new F-16 fighter jets. This makes  Nien-Dzu "Andrew" Yang's role as the MND's policy coordinator a  challenge. 

 Andrew Yang is  Taiwan's deputy defense minister.   (Patrick Lin / AFP via Getty Images) 
The  stakes are high. Should China capture or confederate Taiwan, the  potential is great for destabilizing the region. China, which continues  to threaten to impose unification by force, has more than 1,400  short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. The MND, meanwhile,  faces budget constraints as it struggles to implement an all-volunteer  force, begin an expensive streamlining program, pay for $16 billion in  new U.S. arms released since 2007, and convince Washington to sell it  F-16s and submarines. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced  recently the decision would be made by Oct. 1.
Adding to the  confusion, since 2008, China and Taiwan have signed historic economic  agreements that are moving them closer together. Taiwan has just opened  the floodgates for mainland Chinese visitors, prompting fears of an  increase in espionage and agents of influence here.
Yang is a  former secretary-general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy  Studies and adviser to the Mainland Affairs Council, Ministry of Foreign  Affairs and the MND.
Q. China now has  unprecedented influence over the U.S. with its economic, diplomatic and  military muscle. How can Taiwan expect the U.S. to continue to defend  Taiwan?
A. We are certainly aware that Beijing is a very  important global and regional power and has close mutual interests with  the United States. High-level visits are becoming regular in intensity.  Beijing is increasing their influence over Washington decision-making  not only over Taiwan, but over other important regional and global  issues. 
We firmly believe that Washington still plays great  influence in Asia and has repeatedly made strong commitments to regional  security. Taiwan is a very important factor contributing to the  multilateral effort to preserve peace and stability in this region. So I  do not think the United States will tip over to Beijing's side and  ignore its vested interest in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly  Taiwan. The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized they will continue to honor  the Taiwan Relations Act and provide adequate and necessary articles to  enhance our self-defense.
Q. How has the U.S.  reacted to a reduction of tension between China and Taiwan since Taiwan  President Ma Ying-jeou's 2008 election? 
A. The U.S.  fully supports President Ma's strategy and approaches. They consider his  approach as a way to de-escalate tensions and find opportunities to  enhance peace dividends and to reduce misunderstanding and  miscalculation. This has, in a way, made Beijing less belligerent toward  Taiwan.
Q. Has China reduced the military threat against Taiwan, or the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan?
A.  No, they have not done anything yet. There has been nothing from  Beijing's top leadership on the issue. I think Beijing considers that  both sides can create a new kind of status quo based on engagement. It  doesn't mean that Beijing is reducing its military preparations over  Taiwan, but they have to think twice in terms of their approach. 
There  are more mutual interests involved, not just between Taiwan and  mainland China, but also multilateral interests in this region, which  Beijing needs to continue to develop its economy and stabilize its  society. So Beijing has to make some kind of calculation here - whether  to rock the boat for the sake of pursuing Beijing's unification policy,  either by force or by other means; or work side-by-side with Taiwan and  regional partners to create a more stable, peaceful and prosperous  environment.
Q. As the U.S. becomes economically  weaker and defense budgets are slashed, many in China see the U.S. as a  declining superpower. Will this encourage Chinese adventurism?
A.  If you look at Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Washington  earlier this year, it seems to me that from the policymaker's point of  view, they don't look at each other as enemies. That's number one. They  are still reaching out to each other to the best of their ability to  create a win-win situation. From Chinese leaders' comments, they are not  taking advantage of U.S. weakness to advance Chinese strategic or  national interests in this region. They still emphasize that China  should work along with the U.S. to resolve many problems around the  world.
Q. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary  Clinton has said the U.S. will decide about the sale of 66 F-16C/D  fighters by Oct. 1. What do you think Beijing's reaction will be if the  U.S. releases new F-16s to Taiwan? China calls it a "red line."
A.  They will be extremely unpleasant and upset, as they always are.  They've been calling everything a red line for 30 years, ever since  1979, when the U.S. switched relations from Taipei to Beijing.
If  we don't get the F-16C/Ds to replace our vintage fighters, then we lose  our leverage and immediately face the challenge of fulfilling our  responsibility of preserving peace and stability in the region.  Washington sometimes does not get the right picture of Taiwan's  responsibility. That is part of the reason we want new fighters.  Otherwise, the U.S. has to send its own military to replace our daily  patrols in the region.
China has already sent a strong warning to  Washington that if such a decision is adopted, then U.S.-China relations  will be damaged. Cutting off regular military exchanges is one way to  show Beijing's animosity. But if we look at previous experiences, they  will be downgraded for a while, but they have strong mutual interests  binding each other together. So they have to make a decision on what  will be the next step.
Q. Economic sanctions?
A.  I don't think Beijing will take drastic economic actions against the  U.S., because they have a lot of investments, including huge foreign  reserves in U.S. banks. If the U.S. economy suffers, Beijing suffers.
Q. The U.S. offered Taiwan eight submarines in 2001, but the deal has been stalled. What's the status?
A.  It's a long-delayed decision by the U.S. We are constantly urging them  to pay attention to our concerns because we consider submarines to be  important to our self-defense. 
Q. What would happen if China took control of Taiwan and placed bases here?
A.  It opens the door for Chinese military and power projection not only  into the East China Sea, but also into the South China Sea. Taiwan would  become an important hub and stepping stone for China to exert and  expand its presence in the South China Sea, which is certainly not in  the U.S. interest. It would immediately challenge U.S. strategic  calculations and its security umbrella in the Asia-Pacific region. If  Taiwan becomes part of China in terms of political integration in the  future, then immediately the United States will lose a vital interest in  this part of the world.
Q. There has been talk about beefing up Taiwan's military presence on Taiping Island in the South China Sea.
A.  We are not ruling out our options. But the current decision adopted by  the National Security Council and the president is to improve and  reinforce the Coast Guard's capability on the island. So the Marines are  training the Coast Guard members stationed on the island. We are also  evaluating whether they can actually perform the assigned  responsibilities and duties to protect the island and conduct judicial  patrol over the waters. 
We will never allow China to step onto  the island. It is part of our territory, under our management. There is  no room for compromise.
Q. Is the primary Chinese military threat amphibious invasion or missile bombardment?
A. It's a combination. They have all sorts of options at hand. 
Of  course, Beijing will use the minimum military option to achieve maximum  political objectives. Our way of defending ourselves is to make sure  they pay a high price and cannot succeed in achieving their political  objectives. We have to make sure that if Beijing launches missiles  against Taiwan, they cannot immediately compromise our defense and force  Taiwan to come to terms with Beijing.
Q. Is the streamlining program still on schedule? You are going from conscription to an all-volunteer military force.
A.  It is very much on schedule. By law, we have to implement this  streamlining process starting in January. We have to implement the  all-volunteer program. 
It's an incremental process. We are not  targeting any particular date to complete this transformation.  Certainly, they are predicated on continuous sufficient resource  allocation and support from the legislature.
Q. Do you worry about Beijing becoming more nationalistic, more aggressive?
A.  It is always a major concern. China is a dynamic society. You have many  forces inside China. People only talk about the good side of Chinese  development, but not many pay great attention to the challenges and the  difficulties. 
They are facing increasing domestic problems. We  hope the Chinese government can have better management of those  problems, but you never know. We worry about succession. Beijing is  going to have a top leadership change next year, so who will be the  official leader? What does he think about Taiwan? What will be his  priorities? We don't want to wake up to a renegade in charge of China  who fires missiles over the Taiwan Strait.
Q. How good is Taiwan's intelligence inside China?
A.  We are collecting good stuff, at least from our neighborhood. We also  share our intelligence during regular meetings with the United States  and others. We are much better off than our counterparts, like Japan and  the U.S. The U.S. has its satellite images, but we have our human  intelligence, and our analysts are resourceful. We have analysts who  have spent 30 years watching China. 
Ministry Profile
Established  as the Ministry of War in 1912 in China; became the Ministry of  National Defense in 1946. Moved to Taiwan in 1949 at the end of the  Chinese Civil War.
Defense budget: 
■  $10.2 billion for 2011
■  $11.2 billion projected for 2012
Troop strength: 
■  275,000 currently
■  215,000 projected for 2014