FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. - The U.S. Army appears to be taking seriously a new study that describes problems that plague service acquisition, from writing requirements to full-rate production.
The Army announced it had commissioned the 120-day study last May and asked Gil Decker, a former Army acquisition executive, and retired Gen. Lou Wagner, who served as chief of the Army's Materiel Command, to lead the inquiry.
On the last day here of the Association of the U.S. Army's winter symposium, Wagner ran through the study's recommendations for improving the system. He was not originally on the conference's agenda, but was added after InsideDefense broke news of the study's findings in a Feb. 11 story.
While the study group has clearly outlined the scope of the acquisition problems, it remains to be seen whether its recommendations will lead to the kind of change required.
One of its recommendations is to put a general in charge of the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, currently led by a colonel. GCV and similarly complex acquisition category (ACAT) 1 programs need to have a general in charge, Wagner said.
If it were the Air Force, a three-star would be in charge, Wagner half-joked.
The Army's track record in getting programs out of technology development and into production does not bode well for GCV, planned as a successor to the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The acquisition process for the entire U.S. military requires scores upon scores of reviews and layers of bureaucracy that can slow things down, but the Army's recent history appears particularly bad.
From 1990 to 2010, the Army terminated 22 major programs, Wagner said. Of course, several of those fell under the umbrella of the multibillion-dollar Future Combat Systems effort, which was canceled in 2009. This has led to a loss of trust by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress and industry in the Army's ability to develop good requirements and move a system into production, Wagner said.
The study's recommendations fall into four broad categories:
* Make the requirements process collaborative and timely. This means bringing the key stakeholders in early from across the Army, something the service did do with GCV, Wagner said. For key ACAT 1 programs, the Army should establish a special task force chartered by the chief of staff or the secretary of the Army, Wagner said.
* Manage risk, don't be risk averse.
To this end, Wagner showed a chart that displayed how Army programs were categorized by risk, based on the amount of development work required. A program that intends to develop a system from scratch versus one that plans to upgrade an existing system does not need to go through the same process, Wagner said.
The Army should not undertake developing systems from the ground up unless the system is truly a game-changer, he added.
* Align organizations and accountability. For example, Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier should be renamed PEO Soldier and Small Unit. PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support, which currently manages more than 500 systems, should be broken up into two offices,
* Provide adequate requirements and acquisition resources. To reduce funding instability, the Army could fence off funds for larger programs or fund them with a "capital account."
Wagner said he has briefed many people in the Pentagon on the study, including Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter.
So far, the feedback has been very positive, he said.
The Army announced it had commissioned the 120-day study last May and asked Gil Decker, a former Army acquisition executive, and retired Gen. Lou Wagner, who served as chief of the Army's Materiel Command, to lead the inquiry.
On the last day here of the Association of the U.S. Army's winter symposium, Wagner ran through the study's recommendations for improving the system. He was not originally on the conference's agenda, but was added after InsideDefense broke news of the study's findings in a Feb. 11 story.
While the study group has clearly outlined the scope of the acquisition problems, it remains to be seen whether its recommendations will lead to the kind of change required.
One of its recommendations is to put a general in charge of the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, currently led by a colonel. GCV and similarly complex acquisition category (ACAT) 1 programs need to have a general in charge, Wagner said.
If it were the Air Force, a three-star would be in charge, Wagner half-joked.
The Army's track record in getting programs out of technology development and into production does not bode well for GCV, planned as a successor to the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The acquisition process for the entire U.S. military requires scores upon scores of reviews and layers of bureaucracy that can slow things down, but the Army's recent history appears particularly bad.
From 1990 to 2010, the Army terminated 22 major programs, Wagner said. Of course, several of those fell under the umbrella of the multibillion-dollar Future Combat Systems effort, which was canceled in 2009. This has led to a loss of trust by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress and industry in the Army's ability to develop good requirements and move a system into production, Wagner said.
The study's recommendations fall into four broad categories:
* Make the requirements process collaborative and timely. This means bringing the key stakeholders in early from across the Army, something the service did do with GCV, Wagner said. For key ACAT 1 programs, the Army should establish a special task force chartered by the chief of staff or the secretary of the Army, Wagner said.
* Manage risk, don't be risk averse.
To this end, Wagner showed a chart that displayed how Army programs were categorized by risk, based on the amount of development work required. A program that intends to develop a system from scratch versus one that plans to upgrade an existing system does not need to go through the same process, Wagner said.
The Army should not undertake developing systems from the ground up unless the system is truly a game-changer, he added.
* Align organizations and accountability. For example, Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier should be renamed PEO Soldier and Small Unit. PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support, which currently manages more than 500 systems, should be broken up into two offices,
* Provide adequate requirements and acquisition resources. To reduce funding instability, the Army could fence off funds for larger programs or fund them with a "capital account."
Wagner said he has briefed many people in the Pentagon on the study, including Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter.
So far, the feedback has been very positive, he said.
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